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Articles

SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT IN

CYBERSPACE: THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE TWENTY-FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND STATE REGULATION
OF INTERNET ALCOHOL SALES
Brannon P. Denning*
Recently, some federal judges have given oenophiles everywhere reason to rejoice by striking down, under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, venerable state laws that limit the
import and sale of alcoholic beverages to customers directly. 1
Such laws had presented a considerable obstacle to the sale of

Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University Colh:ge of Law. LL.M., Yah:
Law School, 1999. J.D., The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1995. B.A., The University of the South, 1992. Thanks to Jennifer Gill and Jennifer Daulby for excellent research assistance. Boris Bittkcr, Jacob Cogan, Jack Goldsmith, Pat Kelley, and Gh:nn
Reynolds provided helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts.
I. Sec, e.g., Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2!X)(] WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 5, 2UOO) (refusing to dismiss dormant Commerce Clause challenge to New York direct shipment and
advertising ban); Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (striking Texas
personal importation statute on dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grounds); Bridenbraugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999), rcv'd sub nom., Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson, 2000 WL 1286249 (7th Cir. 2000). The most recent opinion in the New
York litigation, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31521023 (S.D.N.Y. 2(XJ2), summarized
the recent decisions, which arc in some disarray.
Owing to the unusual length of time between the writing of this article and its publication, I was unable to discuss the most recent decisions discussing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the Twenty-first Amendment in detail. In addition to the
Swedenburg decision mentioned above, sec Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F. 3d 1104 (11th
Cir. 2002); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Beskind v. Easley,
197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va.
2002); Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2<Xll).
I have tried to remedy this with brief discussions of the most recent decisions in the footnotes accompanying my discussion of earlier lower court cases. Sec Part IV. I thank the
editors for allowing me to update my article during the editing process.
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alcohol, wines in particular, over the Internet. 2 For the most
part, only parents concerned about sales to minors and in-state
liquor distributors have voiced concern. Many commentators
approve of federal court application of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine-the long-standing guarantee that parochial
barriers will not be allowed to inhibit the free-flow of goods
throughout our national market-to invalidate these laws. 3
But one might ask, glancing at a copy of the Constitution,
what of the Twenty-first Amendment? 4 Section Two of that
amendment, after all, reads: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. " 5 The plain text of that section suggests that these recent court decisions are mistaken. 6
2. Sec, e.g., Uncorking a Wine Industry Controversy, Nat'l J. 472 (Feb. 12, 2000)
("Thirty states prohibit the direct sale by producer to consumer."); R.W. Apple, Zinfandel by Mail? Well, Yes and No, N.Y. Times F1 (May 19, 1999). Most states have some
form of a ''three-tier" liquor distribution system in place. As a Michigan court succinctly
explained, under such a syst~m. "consumers must purchase alcoholic beverages from licensed retailers; retailers must purchase them from licensed wholesalers; and wholesalers
must purchase them from licensed manufacturers." Heald v. Engler, (No. CIU.A. 00CV-71438) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24825 at *3 (E.D. Mich.) (Sept. 28, 2!Xll). Under
som.: states' laws, in-state producers arc exempt from the common prohibition on direct
shipment to consumers.
3. Sec, e.g., Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcoholic Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce
Clause, and the Twenty-first Amendment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 353, 354 (1999) (arguing that
laws should be sustained only when they further the "core" purpose of the Twenty-first
Amendment, which is temperance); sec also Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitu-

tional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to
Evaluate State Regulation oj Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 Duke L.J.
1619, 1653-59 (2!XJO) (describing the debate over whether Congress should regulate
Internet alcohol sales to ensure validity of state laws to prevent underage drinking, as
well as allegations that such laws simply prop up state distributors and wholesalers);
"Cyber-bootlegging" Just Rhetoric for Protectionism, Houston Chron., (May 2, 2()(Xl),
available at 2()()0 WL 4295786.
4. Sec U.S. Const., Amend. XXI. Ratified in 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment
contained three sections; only section two is of major importance to my article. The first
section merely repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, which inaugurated national prohibition. Sec id. § l. Section three imposed a seven year time limit on ratification. Sec id.

o.

s

5. !d. 2.
6. Laurence Tribe has correctly pointed out that the Twenty-first Amendment
docs not actually empower the states to control the liquor trade, but rather curiously
makes the violation of a state's liquor laws unconstitutional. Laurence H. Tribe, How to
Violate the Constitution Without Even Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to
the Balanced Budget Amendment, in William N. Eskridge and Sanford Levinson, eds.,
Constitwional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 99 (New York U. Press, 1998). He
acknowledges elsewhere, however, that "interpreting § 2, in accord with its apparent
purposes, as authorizing states to regulate the importation of liquor in certain ways that,
without the Twenty-first Amendment, would violate the Commerce Clause is surely the
best way to read the provision so that it makes practical sense .... " Laurence H. Tribe, 1
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Yet the courts tell us that the Twenty-first Amendment is not to
be read literally or invoked as a shield for protectionist legislation. Only laws designed to promote "temperance," they say,
are protected by the Amendment from dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 7
Where did the district courts get the idea for this distinction-between "good" alcohol legislation, which furthers the
state's legitimate "core" interest in temperance, and is protected
under the Twenty-first Amendment, and "bad" legislation motivated by simple economic protectionism and thus constitutionally impermissible? Certainly not from the text of the Amendment, whose wording makes no such distinction. Not from the
Framers of the Twenty-first Amendment, whom the recent court
decisions barely discuss. 8 Not from Congress, which recently
opened the federal courts to state attorneys general to enforce
state legislation against out-of-state alcohol shippers. 9 Rather, it
is the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning over
thirty years ago, that has constrained the operation of the
Amendment to such a degree that it has become an '"almost'
forgotten clause of the Constitution." 10 Yet, shortly after the
Amendment's ratification, when the Court was first called upon
to interpret it, no less a gray eminence than Mr. Justice Brandeis
turned aside a number of challenges to allegedly protectionist
state liquor legislation, arguing that to make the distinctions
made by recent lower courts, would be to effect not a "construction" of the Amendment, but a "rewriting" of it. 11
To put it plainly, recent lower court decisions have indulged
in broad applications of the Supreme Court's own narrow interpretations of the Twenty-first Amendment-fashioned in cases
whose facts went beyond the explicit text of the Amendment-

American ConslilLl/ional Law§ 1-12, at 36 n.15 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed., 20<Xl).
7. Sec, e.g., Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32; Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383
(cited in note 3) ("'There is only one reason to distinguish alcohol from other commodities in terms of federal power over interstate commerce: the state's interest in promoting
temperance.").
8. Sec Part IV.
9. Sec, e.g., S. 577, 106th Cong., 2d Scss. (March 2, 2000) (providing for federal
injunctive relief to state attorneys general to stop the importation or transportation of
liquor into or through their state in violation of state law); Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at
1653-59 (cited in note 3) (describing debate over the so-called "Twenty-first Amendment
Enforcement Act").
I 0. Duckwonh v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 399 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson was expressing his displeasure at his brethren for making inroads on the
power of the states granted to them under his reading of the Amendment.
II. Sec notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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and have erroneously concluded that those decisions dictate the
invalidation of state liquor importation laws. That courts continue to construe narrowly-nearly to the vanishing point-a
specific reservation of state power at federalism's high tide of judicial enforceability, seems particularly worthy of attention. The
growing market for interstate shipment of alcohol, and the near
unanimity of federal courts in their continued assertions of the
Twenty-first Amendment's irrelevance, makes this an appropriate time for a reexamination of the Amendment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it.
In this essay, I will do three things. First, I will summarize
the history of the framing and ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment. Its purposes were well understood to go beyond
merely allowing states to pursue temperance policies. At the
time, the question was understood to be whether the states or
the federal government would control the liquor trade. Second,
I will chart the evolution of the Supreme Court's Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence and describe the Court's move from
rules to standards in applying the Amendment. The adoption of
the more flexible approach, I will show, has resulted in a dramatic reduction of state power over alcohol. Finally, I will critique the district court decisions that limit states in the one area
in which their power remained largely unquestioned by the Supreme Court-the regulation of liquor imports from out-of-state.
If these recent decisions are affirmed, the result will be the functional repeal of the Twenty-first Amendment. In hopes of averting this, I offer suggestions to lower courts and to the Supreme
Court for applying the Amendment in future cases.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF ALCOHOL

BEFORE PROHIBITION
States began to regulate the sale of alcohol in the nineteenth
century, sometimes prohibiting it altogether, under their police
power. 12 Many states exempted "personal users" from their liquor laws, which tended to restrict only wholesalers and retailers.
12. The Court upheld such regulations, even though they involved some regulation
of interstate commerce in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). The Court,
however. did not offer a consistent rationale, rather delivering its opinion in what Carl
Swisher termed "a riot of diversity." Carl Brent Swisher, 5 The History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: The Taney Period 375 (MacMillan, 1971 ). For the information
here, and that which follows in this section, I have freely drawn on Boris I. Bittker's,
Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce~~ 9.02, 13.01-13.04, 13.06
(Aspen Law & Business, 1999).
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But when states attempted to expand their laws and prohibit importation of out-of-state liquor for in-state delivery, the Supreme
Court struck down the import bans as direct regulations of interstate commerce. 13 "The absence of any law of Congress on the
subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that
matter shall be free," held the Court in Leisy v. Hardin. 14
Alarmed, states pressed Congress for permission to freely regulate alcohol. Congress responded with the Wilson Act of 1890, 15
which gave states the right to regulate liquor the moment it arrived in the state "to the same extent and in the same manner as
though such ... liquor had been produced" there, regardless
whether such liquor was in its "original package" or not. 16 A
year later, In re Rahrer 17 blessed this "reconveyance" of regulatory power by Congress to the states. Through the exercise of its
commerce power, the Court reasoned, Congress was free to "divest" an article of commerce of its interstate characteristics. 18
Despite the Wilson Act, the Court later struck down more
state laws restricting the importation of liquor for personal use,
again prompting congressional action. In 1898, the Court invali13. Sec, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (invalidating an Iowa law restricting local manufacture, importation, and sale of liquor, as applied to Illinois beer seized in
Iowa); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (invalidating an Iowa law
prohibiting railroads from importing liquor unless accompanied by a certificate that consignee was licensed to sell liquor). Sec Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth
Amendment 56 (U. North Carolina Press, 1995) ("The U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal interstate commerce power shaped the course of the prohibition
movement. .
[T]he brewers, after failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment right to
make liquor, turned to the federal commerce power to curtail the effects of state prohibition."). Hamm writes that "[w]ithin a month of [Leisy], 'original package houses' and
'supreme court saloons' had sprung up in every prohibition state." !d. at 69. According
to Hamm, Bowman "became a powerful wedge for them to usc to force their wares into
dry states. Liquor in transit could not be legally seized nor could it be stopped at the
state ·s borders." !d. at 66.
14. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 119. Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 56-57
(cited in note 13) (cases like Bowman and Leisy "define[ d) the limits of state action over
liquor so as to insure freedom of commerce within the nation and protect the federal
government's power to regulate commerce"; at the same time, they "created a national
crisis over liquor control and prompted Congress to act.").
15. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 57 (cited
in note 13) ("The Supreme Court's interstate commerce decisions created an 'original
package business' that threatened all liquor controls and created a crisis in alcohol policy" resulting in the passage of the Wilson Act, which inaugurated "a system of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over liquor.").
16. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The reference to the "original package" was necessary because of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Brown v. Maryland that goods were immune
from state taxation so long as they were in their original packages. The doctrine, now
discarded, was expanded by subsequent courts, and was an important part of the Court's
early dormant Commerce Clause doctrine jurisprudence.
17. 140 U.S. 545 (1891 ).
18. ld. at 562.
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dated a South Carolina law that prohibited the shipment of liquor into the state, as applied to consignment shipments to individuals for personal use. 19 Cong,ress eventually responded with
the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913,2 which prohibited the "shipment
or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever"
of liquor "from one State, Territory, or District of the United
States" into another "in violation of any law" of the State, Territory, or District. 21 The Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., relying in
part on the assertion in In Re Rahrer that Congress could "divest" commodities of their interstate character, so as to permit
state regulation otherwise forbidden by the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. 22
Two years after Clark Distilling Co., the Eighteenth
Amendment was ratified, and nationwide prohibition became
the law of the land. 23 Proposed in part as a sop to "drys" around
19. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898); sec also Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U.S. 412 (1898) (holding that goods "arrived" in a state only when delivered to the
consigncc, effectively immunizing from state regulation liquor arriving by interstate car·
rier). Alex Bickel commented that the Vandercook decision sanctioning mail-order liq·
uor sales facilitated "the w..:tncss that the Webb-Kenyon Act was intended to sop up."
Alexander M. Bickel and Bcnno C. Schmidt, Jr., 10 History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: The Judiciary and Responsible Government, i910-21 at 440 (Macmillan,
I 984); sec also Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 176-77 (cited in note 13).
Hamm notes that for seventeen years after Vandercook, "prohibitionists did not usc law
to attack personal-usc shipments"; in turn "[s]hippers, liberated from state hindrance ...
deluged the prohibition stales with intoxicating beverages, stimulating more court cases."
!d. at 178. The decision "created a nourishing interstate commerce in alcohol between
wet and dry states. . . . Th..: ... express freight offices in prohibition territory often became little more than interstate commerce liquor package stores." ld at 179.
20. 37 Stat. 699 (1913). For more on the passage of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts, and the Court cases that upheld them, sec, for example, Hamm, Shaping the Eight·
eemh Amendment at 81-90, 212-20 (cited in note 13). President Taft vetoed WebbKenyon, which passed over his objections. Sec Bickel and Schmidt, History of the Supreme Court at 441-42 (cited in note 19).
21. 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
22. 242 U.S. 311,330 (1917). It did, however, suggest that such power might be restricted to liquor, given "[t]he fact that regulations of liquor have been upheld in numberless instances which would have been repugnant to the great guarantees of the Constitution but for thc enlarged right possessed by government to regulate liquor." ld. at 332
(emphasis added). But sec Bittker, Regulation of interstate and Foreign Commerce at 912 (cited in note 12) (footnote omitted) (suggesting absence of any principled rationale
for confining congressional power to liquor; noting that "later cases have ruled that Congress can consent to state regulations of interstate commerce in products with a more
benign character than booze, such as insurance"). For an early assessment of WebbKenyon's constitutionality, see Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an
Article of its interstate Character: An Examination of the Doctrine Underlying the WebbKenyon Act (2 pts.), 5 Minn. L. Rev. 100, 253 (1921). On "reconveyance" of power by
Congress to the states generally, sec Bittker, Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce at** 9.01-9.06 (cited in note 12).
23. For the story of Prohibition, sec Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An
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the country and partly as a "war measure necessary for the saving of food and man power," 24 this social experiment soon ran
into problems of widespread noncompliance, the rise of criminal
rackets to satisfy the demand for alcohol, and the unwillingness
of legislatures to appropriate_ resources for a real attempt to
force nationwide compliance. 2 ) It took the Great Depression,
however, to effect the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and
bring an end to the "noble experiment"of Prohibition. 26
II. THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
The election of 1932 was a mandate for radical reform of
America's experiment with prohibition; both the GOP and Democratic Party platforms had called for its repeal. The Senate
Judiciary Committee went to work; and by February, 1933, it reported out Senate Joint Resolution 211, which would have repealed prohibition, prohibited the importation of alcohol into
states in violation of state law, and allowed for concurrent federal power "to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor
to be drunk on the premises where sold"- a provision squarely
aimed at ensuring that, no matter what, the Nation would be
spared the return of the dreaded "saloon." It was this provision,
then Section Three of the proposed Amendment, that proved to
be the most controversial. The reasons for its eventual abandonment refute the notion that the Amendment was concerned
only with promoting temperance or constitutionalizing the
Webb-Kenyon Act. 27
Interpretation of American Prohibition (Norton, 1976); Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth
Amendment (cited in note 13); Richard Hofstadtcr, The Age of Reform 289-93 (Knopf,
1955).
24. John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 at 177 (Harper, 1960). Other
historians similarly note the linkages between war mobilization and prohibition. Sec,
e.g., Bickel and Schmidt, Hiswry of the Supreme Court at 531 (cited in note 19); Clark,
Deliver Us From Evil at 128 (cited in note 23) (discussing the embrace of "the crusade for
national and international purity" and noting that "as the country steadied itself for the
great sacrifice, civilians were crusaders no less than servicemen, and conditions less than
bone-dry became conditions less than patriotic"); Hofstadter, The Age of Reform at 29192 (cited in note 23).
25. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy at 177-80, 261-62 (cited in note 24).
26. Id. at 262 ("Just as the Eighteenth Amendment was the child of the First World
War, so its repeal was the child of the Great Depression."); William Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 at 9 (Harper & Row, 1963). Sec also
Clark, Delh·er Us From Evil at 205 (cited in note 23) (noting that in the early part of the
Depression, FOR emerged as ·'the symbol of liberalism, relief, and confidence. Repeal
would go with relief, recovery, and reform").
27. A consistent claim among commentators who either objected to the Supreme
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Two things are clear from the Senate debates on the proposed amendment. First, supporters of Section Two intended
the Amendment to return control over shipment and importation of alcohol to the states, and to insulate that state control
from either congressional second-thoughts about the WebbKenyon Act or a hostile Supreme Court decision striking down
the Act. 28 In other words, with regard to the importation of alCourt's early interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment or who approve of its more
recent cases circumscribing state power is that the intent of Section Two was "merely"
meant to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act, and that states ought not be allowed to
exercise more power than that which the statute conveyed; or that it was merely passed
to protect dry states. Sec. e.g., John H. Crabb, State Power Over Liquor Under the
Twenty-first Amendment, 12 U. Del. L.J. 11, 13 (1948) (noting similarities between the
second section of the Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act); Douglass, 49 Duke L.J.
at 1632-33 (cited in note 3) (interpreting Senate debate on the Amendment to endorse
''the limited purpose of allowing states to remain dry after the repeal of Prohibition.");
Eric T. Freeman, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause:
What Rationale Supports Bacchus Imports?, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 361, 374 & n.100
(1986) (arguing that "several Senators supported Section Two" based on the understanding that it did little more than give dry states the ability to resist importation of liquor);
Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 375 (cited in note 3) ("Recent lower court cases have demonstrated that temperance is the core purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment."); Ralph L.
Wiser and Richard L. Arledge, Does the Repeal Amendment Empower a State to Erect
Tariff Barriers and Disregard the Equal Protection Clause ir. Legislation on Intoxicating
Liquors in Interstate Commerce?, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. 402, 402, 407 (1939) ("The second section of the Amendment generally was thought of as ... assurance that dry states
would be protected from an influx of imported liquor" as opposed to "authorization for
state tariff laws"; criticizing Supreme Court decisions giving a broader construction for
"refusing to consider this background"); Note, Constitutional Law-State Control of Alcoholic Beverages in Interstate Commerce, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 127, 131 (1952) ("The principal object of the Twenty-first Amendment was to permit each state to act as sole referee in the local battle between the 'wets' and the 'drys"' not to permit erection of trade
barriers and "interfere with the free movement of alcoholic beverages"); Note, The
Twenty-first Amendment ~'ersus the Interstate Commerce Clause, 55 Yale L.J. 815, 817
(1946) (arguing that the Amendment merely constitutionalizcd Webb-Kenyon Act).
There arc several problems with the analysis of the commentators who take this
view. First, it cannot be denied that Section Two of the Amendment reads differently
than docs the Webb-Kenyon Act. Second, the support they amass for the "constitutionalization of Webb-Kenyon" thesis is meager-it often consists of one or two ambiguous
remarks of Senators. Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at374 & n.100. Finally,
most commentators fail to examine closely the debate surrounding the third section of
the proposed amendment reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The reasons
senators expressed for opposing the concurrent exercise of enforcement power by the
state and federal government sheds a good deal of light on the purpose behind Section
Two, and on the question whether it was simply meant to insure that dry states would
have their right to be dry guaranteed by the Constitution. Wet states, too, had an interest in ensuring control over their own alcohol policies free from the specter of federal
interference. Sec notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
28. Sec, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (speaking in favor of the Amendment "to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States" and that it is necessary to insure agai~st a hostile decision by the Supreme Court); id at4170 (statement of Sen. Borah) (noting that Section
Two is necessary; otherwise "we arc turning the dry States over for protection to a law
[i.e., the Webb-Kenyon Act] which is still of doubtful constitutionality and which, as it
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cohol, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was to be inoperative. As S.J. 211's sponsor, Senator John J. Blaine, explained
it:
When our government was organized and the Constitution of
the United States was adopted, the States surrendered control
over and regulation of interstate commerce. This proposal is
restoring to the States ... the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commodity-namely, intoxicating liquor. ...
[Bjy reason of this provision, ~the State] in effect acquires
9
powers that it has not at this time. -

Second, the section purporting to grant concurrent power to
the states and the Federal Government to regulate the "saloon"
was eliminated because of fears that it would invite congressional encroachment onto the states' regulatory prerogatives
30
that Section Two was supposed to secure.
Even the Senate
manager of S.J. 211, Senator Blaine, spoke at length in opposition to Section Three. In his "personal opinion," said Blaine,
section 3 is ... contrary to section 2 of the resolution .... The
purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate
commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the confines of the States. . . . Thus, the States are granted larger
power ... and are given greater protection, while under section 3 the proposal is to take away from the States the powers
that the States would have in the absence of the eighteenth
amendment. My view ... is that section 3 is inconsistent with
section 2, and that section 3 ought to be taken out of the resolution.31

was upheld by a divided court, might very well be held unconstitutional upon a representation of it"; and "we arc asking dry Stales to rely upon the Congress of the
United Stales to maintain indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law," possibly in the face of
strong pressure to repeal); id. at 4172 (statment of Sen. Borah) ("Therefore, if we arc to
have what we arc now promised, local self-government, State rights, the right of the people of the respective Stales to adopt and enJOY their own policies, we must have ... some
other provision of the Constitution, than those which existed prior to the adoption of the
eighteenth amendment.").
29. Id. at 4141 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added).
30. Sec, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. at 4143 (statement of Sen. Wagner); id. (statement of
Sen. Blaine); id. at4144-45 (statement of Sen. Wagner) (terming Section Three a "nullification of the entire program of repeal"); id. at 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner); id. at
4177 (statement of Sen. Black) ("If this amendment should become part of the Constitution containing section 3, it would take away from the State the right the State now has to
regulate or prohibit the sale of liquor. It would take it away by giving that power to
Congress.").
3 I. !d. at 4143 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added).
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Senator Hugo Black echoed Blaine's position. Were Section
Three to become part of the Constitution, he argued, "it would
take away from the state the right the State now has to regulate
or prohibit the sale of liquor ... by giving that power to Congress."32
In addition, opponents of Section Three pointed out legal
difficulties bound to arise from the language of the provision,
which purported to give Congress concurrent power to regulate
or prohibit the sale of liquor "to be drunk on the premises where
sold. " 33 What would become of state laws prohibiting consumption of liquor where sold, if Congress chose to regulate, but not
to prohibit the saloon? An early colloquy among Senators
Blaine, Wagner and Shortridge illustrates the problem. 34 Senator Blaine, explaining the position of the committee on Section
Three, stated that in the absence of federal regulation of saloons,
state laws "would be supreme." 35 If Congress, on the other
hand, "legislated upon that question . . . the States would
have ... power to legislate along the same lines." 36 When Senator Shortridge asked, "Which would be supreme," 37 Senator
Blaine at first demurred, saying that was "a field in which we can
get into all kinds of misunderstanding." 38 Pressed by Senator
Wagner, who asked whether state or federal law would prevail in
the event of a conflict, 39 Senator Blaine conceded that federal
law would likely prevail. 40 Senator WaRner thus concluded that
"the word 'concurrent' is meaningless."
Opponents of Section Three pointed out that since the proposed amendment would give both the state and federal government equal power, it was not at all clear that ordinary preemption rules applied. If they did, then the result was equally
unacceptable, because it provided a backdoor for federal power,
which could overwhelm state regulatory efforts. Senator Blaine
pronounced Sections Two and Three "inconsistent" and "incompatible."42 Senator Wagner went further, alleging that Sec32. !d. at 4177 (statement of Sen. Black).
33. Sec S.J. 211, 3.
34. 75 Cong. Rcc. 4143 (1933).
35. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine).
36. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine).
3 7. !d. (statement of Sen. Shortridge).
38. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine).
39. Id. (statement of Sen. Wagner).
40. Sec id ("'In my opinion, Federal law would prevail ... as it docs under the
eighteenth amendment.") (statement of Sen. Blaine).
41. !d. (statement of Sen. Wagner).
42. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine).

*
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tion Three effected a "nullification of the entire program of repeal."43 If Section Three remained, "we shall have two authorities, Federal and State, simultaneously possessed of jurisdiction
over the same area of regulation. The zone each is to occupy is
undefined. "44 This would "unavoidably lead[] to confusion, conflict, and litigation," as well as domination of the states by federal authorities. 45 Senator Brookhart claimed that the grant of
equal power to state and federal governments meant that conflicting laws would both be constitutional, resulting in "a state of
civil war between the State and the National Government." 46
Senator (later Justice) Black declared that "[b]oth the State and
the Federal Government cannot have the power at the same
time. The action of one of them will be the supreme law of the
land, and the supreme law of the land of every State is the Constitution of the United States. "47 Therefore, language about
"concurrent" power notwithstanding, federal laws would prevail
if there was a conflict. Then "the States of this Union will be
helpless," concluded Black, because "they can not regulate the
sale of liquor within their own boundaries, nor can they prohibit
it." 48 By one vote, senators' insistence on an unambiguous grant
of power over liquor to the states overcame everyone's professed horror at the prospect of the saloon's return, and Section
Three was struck from S.J. 211. 49 Following removal of Section
Three, the Senate approved the measure 63-23.
43. Id. at 4145 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
44. ld.
45. Jd. Later, Wagner confessed "that my imagination is not sufficiently fertile to
foresee all of the extensions which will be grafted onto section 3 should it ever be incorporated into the Constitution." Id at 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner). He noted that
the grant of power to Congress in Section Three could be easily expanded by employing
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Sec id. (statement of Sen. Wagner). New York Senator Robert F. Wagner was an ardent opponent of Prohibition. That he was concerned
about the role the federal government would play in the future regulation of liquor at the
state level belies the notion that Section Two was solely meant to protect dry states.
Wets, too, worried that drys from the West and South could combine to again impose
prohibition through the proposed Section Three. Sec, e.g., Outriglu Repeal Urged By
Wagner, N.Y. Times 4 (Dec. 19, 1932) (arguing further that states could effectively prevent the return of the saloon).
46. 75 Cong. R~.:c. at 4155 (statement of Sen. Brookhart); sec also id. at 4161
(statement of Sen. Brookhart) (asking Sen. Norris whether Section Three would not
mean that "if the States have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in a saloon ... that power just as high and just as dominating as the concurrent power of the Congress?"): id. at 4173 (colloquy between Senators Borah and Hastings).
47. Jd. at 4178 (statement of Sen. Black).
48. ld.
49. ld. at 4179. The vote was 33-32, with 31 not voting. Not everyone was enthusiastic about the devolution of power to the States. One member of the House complained
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Even after some delay occasioned by the need for states to
call and organize the ratification conventions, the requisite number of states had ratified the Amendment before 1933 was out.
To the extent that the delegates to state conventions left any record of what they thought the Amendment would do, 5° they proclaimed the Amendment to have restored a measure of power to
states that the states did not previously possess, a!ld insulated
the exercise of that power from federal interference. ' 1
that Section Two embodied ·'the extreme of State rights." 76 Cong. Rec. 2774, 2776
(1933) (extension of remarks by Rep. Lea). "It is theoretically unsound," Rep. Lea complained,
to propose that each State in the country shall have the right to compel the
Federal Government, without any discretion of Congress, to support whatever
statutory liquor laws the State legislatures sec fit to write, however unwise or
improvident. . . . Under this color of constitutional sanction, a State might pass
a law to interfere with legitimate interstate shipments .... No one could anticipate the many varied, and perhaps unwise, provisions that might be written by
the various States of the country ....
!d. No one responded that such "unwise or improvident" state laws would be forbidden
by the Amendment.
50. For the documentary record of the ratifying conventions, sec Everette Somerville Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States (U. of Michigan Press, 1938). Most states' conventions ratified the Amendment
unanimously and without substantive debate. New Hampshire's convention lasted all of
seventeen minutes. Sec id at 284. To date, the Twenty-first Amendment is the only
amendment to be ratified by specially-convened state conventions. For more on the ratification process in the states, sec Everett S. Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, 29 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. HXl5 (1935).
51. Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitwion of the
United States at 50 (cited in note 50) (Amendment "rcturn[cd] to the peoples of the several states ... their constitutional right to govern themselves in their internal affairs ... ")
(statement of President of the Connecticut Convention), id. at 167 (noting that the
Twenty-first Amendment "expresses a widespread and deep-rooted conviction among
our people of the right of the states to govern their internal and local affairs, and it dcsigratcs as one office of the Federal authority ... to uphold the states in their authority")
(statement of Miss Laura Clay).
Contemporary accounts of the debate over repeal and of the congressional debates
over the proposed Amendment support the conclusion that the issue was not simply
about constitutionalizing Webb-Kenyon, or about protecting dry states from liquor. Sec,
e.g., Leuer to the Editor, N.Y. Times~ 4 at 5 (Feb. 5, 1933) (discussing repeal of Prohibition in terms of "rcstor[ing] control of liquor traffic to the States"; Prohibition had effected "the transfer of police power over the liquor traffic to the Federal Government,"
repeal would "rcstor[e] ... this power to the States"); Wets Select Plan for Test in House,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 1932) (describing effort by House supporters of repeal to craft language of repeal amendment, including provision "that Congress shall not interfere with
the liquor traffic within States that desire to authorize manufacture or sale of liquor"); A
Liquor Plan, N.Y. Times 16 (Sept. 19, 1932) (noting views of New York supporter of repeal that "the first subsequent duty of the States is to prepare to resume regulation of the
liquor traffic" and that "[t]heir authority in that province ... must be sole and undtvided.
No further Federal intrusion on it must be tolerated."); Unrepealing Repeal, N.Y. Ttmes
~ 4, at 4 (Jan. 8, 1933) (editorial critical of proposed Section Three; concluding that
"Federal prohibition is to be destroyed by retaining it in part. ... It leaves the regulation
of the liquor traffic partly in the hands of the States, partly in the hands of the Federal
Government."; terming it a ''two-faced and dishonest repeal"); ''Modified Repeal," N.Y.
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***
Prior to the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine had restricted state authority over the importation of alcohol into their territory, which undermined state regulatory efforts and eroded congressional protections for bolder state law enforcement efforts.
When
structuring the repeal of Prohibition, Congress heeded the demands of states that the Amendment secure states power over
alcohol that would be immune from a Congress dominated by
wets or drys, which may repeal or greatly expand congressional
statutes like the Webb-Kenyon Act, and insulate state alcohol
regulation from dormant Commerce Clause challenges that had
bedeviled enforcement efforts prior to Prohibition. Proponents
of state control vigorously (and successfully) opposed an attempt
to give Congress "concurrent" authority over the "saloon," in
large part for fear that congressional power would eventually
eclipse the power of the states over alcohol. The message from
Congress, the state ratifying conventions, and the text of the
Amendment itself seemed clear: Liquor was different. In the
years immediately,,following ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Supreme Court's opinions confirmed this consensus.

Times 18 (Jan. II, 1933) (arguing that, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the amendment continues Prohibition in part; claiming that Section Two is superfluous because Webb-Kenyon was still in effect, and that the proposed Section Three "prolongs the power of Federal Prohibition"; noting that "There is likely to be a perpetual
effort to restore the old regime." It was enough that "the Federal hand is not to be taken
off the throats of the States, that they are not to be free to deal, each in its own way, with
the liquor traffic, is more than enough to condemn this section."); Shouse Hits Blaine
Plan, N.Y. Times 8 (Feb. 7, 1933) (reporting charges of the President of the Association
Against the Prohibition Amendment that proposed repeal amendment "'prolong[ed) the
necessity of Federal jurisdiction in an intolerable way"'); Repeal Voce Today Sec in the
Senate; Filibuster Broken, N.Y. Times I (Feb. 16, 1933) ("Senator Borah [a Prohibition
supporter) agreed that the government would be helpless to prevent the return of the
saloon.. . 'Once you legalize liquor, as a practical proposition you cannot possibly supervise its sale'. . . 'If we should execute such a power as herein prescribed we would be
operating against the States that had legalized a saloon system."'); TRB, Washington
Notes, The New Republic 233 (July 13, 1932) ("The division today is not between the
Drys and the Wets, not between the advocates of the Eighteenth Amendment and its
opponents. The division is between the moderate Wets, who were once Drys, and the
extreme Wets; between those who want state control of the liquor business under federal
supervision and those who want state control without limitation."). But sec Senate Votes
Dry Repeal By Conventions In States; House Will Act Monday, N.Y. Times I (Feb. 17,
1933) (describing Section Two as "a provision for Federal protection of dry States").
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III. THE COURT INTERPRETS THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Soon after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment,
the Supreme Court rejected several challenges to state liquor
regulation. Possible protectionist motives for the regulations
notwithstanding, the Court held that the Amendment was intended to return total control over liquor to the States. Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Court instead applied the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to state regulations not directly
related to importation of liquor into the state for delivery or use.
While many regulations were upheld, the door was open to challenge "unreasonable" alcohol regulations. In the mid-1960s, a
pair of decisions that ostensibly protected the States' "core"
Twenty-first Amendment power over importation struck down
state regulations of alcohol imports for the first time since the
1890s. These cases contained language employed in later cases
to invalidate state liquor regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.
A. THE YOUNG'S MARKET CASES
In State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's
Market Co. ,52 California's $500 license-fee for the privilege of
importing beer from outside the state was upheld against Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges. "Prior to
the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment," Justice
Brandeis wrote, "it would obviously have been unconstitutional
to have imposed any fee" on importation, "because the fee
would be a direct burden on interstate commerce. " 53 The
Amendment, he continued, "abrogated the right to import
free ... intoxicating liquors. " 54 The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
were asking the Court to read the Amendment to authorize only
state prohibition in toto, "but if it permits ... manufacture an~
sale, it must let imported liquors compete ... on equal terms. "~ 5
To adopt this argument, he concluded, "would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting of it. " 56 For
52.
53.

299 U.S. 59 (1936).
!d. at 62.
54. !d.
55. !d.
56. !d. One student note termed the Young's Market approach "unpurposive verbalism," and criticized the result for "sanction[ing]thc Balkanization of American trade,
commerce, and industry." Note, 55 Yale L.J. at 819 (cited in note 27); see also Note, 27
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 129-30 (cited in note 27) (stating the Young's Market line of cases
inaugurated "a tariff war in regard to liquor commerce") (footnote omitted).
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Brandeis, the greater power of total prohibition surely entailed
lesser restrictions, including state monopoly of manufacture and
sale, prohibition on importations, high taxation on imports, and
partial prohibition. 57 Two years later, when a Minnesota statute
discriminating against out-of-state liquor was challenged, Justice
Brandeis wrote that Young's Market had "settled" the question
whether "under the amendment, discrimination against imported liquor is permissible although it ~s not an incident of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic. "~ 8
In 1939, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Young's Market in a pair of opinions also written by Justice Brandeis. 59 Upholding a Missouri ban on the alcohol imports from states that
themselves had discriminatory import policies, Justice Brandeis
held the alleged discriminatory intent of the Missouri statute to
be entirely beside the point. 6° Following the Twenty-first
Amendment, he wrote, "the right of a State to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the
commerce clause. " 61 In a companion case decided the same day
involving a similar Michigan statute, Brandeis wrote that "the
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; and ... discrimination between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors,
or between imported intoxicating liquors, is not prohibited by
the equal protection clause. " 62
auguratcd ··a tariff war in regard to liquor commerce") (footnote omitted).
57. See Young's Market, 299 U.S. at63 ("If it may permit the domestic manufacture
and sale of beer and exclude all made without the state, may it not, instead of absolute
exclusion, subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fcc"l").
58. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938).
59. Sec Joseph 5. Finch & Co. v. McKiurick, 305 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
60. Joseph 5. Finch & Co. 305 U.S. at 397-98.
61. Id. at 398.
62. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 394 (citation omitted). Nor, he added,
was there any merit to the claim that such laws violated due process. "The substantive
power of the State to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor is undoubted." Id. Sec also
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (upholding Kentucky act that imposed rigorous conditions on the manufacture and transport of liquor). The appellant in Ziffrin
complained that the act '·prevent[sj an authorized interstate contract carrin from continuing an established business of transporting exports of liquors from Kentucky in interstate commerce exclusively." Id. at 137. The Court again, per Justice McReynolds, rejected such arguments: "The Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a state to
legislate: concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.
Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate
these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect of them." I d. at 138. Despite the fact that the Kentucky law governed exports, Justice McReynolds contended
that, again, the power to absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicants encompassed myriad lesser powers, including the restrictions adopted here by Kentucky.
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The only "limit" the Court placed on the Amendment during the 1930s resulted from the Court's holding that the
Amendment did not apply in a federal enclave, like a national
park. 63 Given this unambiguous early construction of the
Amendment by the Court, it is surprising that later Courts have
characterized the intent of Section Two as "obscur[ e]" and
claimed that "[n]o clear consensus" concerning its meaning "is
apparent." 64 Even if the legislative intent had been somewhat
ambiguous (which it was not), 65 the early decisions of the Court
are not. If states sought to regulate the importation of alcohol
into their borders, neither the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Sec id. at 139. For more on Ziffrin, sec Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 671 (1940).
Many early commentators found the Court's conclusion that the Twenty-first
Amendment abrogated the Fourteenth Amendment the most troubling part of the
Young's Market line of cases. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 28 (cited in note 27)
(arguing that "the words of the Amendment do[ J not appear to sanction discrimination
whose purpose it is to secure commercial advantage to the domestic product over the
foreign" and that such laws would, but for Young's Market, ct al., violate the Equal Protection Clause); Wiser and Arledge, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 413-14 (cited in note 27)
(concluding that the Twenty-first Amendment "deals with public health and morals, not
with economics and commerce" whose undoubted purpose was to allow states freedom
to exercise police and taxing powers, but not to grant discriminatory powers that violate
other constitutional provisions, like the Fourteenth Amendment); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 130-31 (cited in note 27) ("By determining that state power over liquor traffic is
not limited by the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the courts have
sown the seeds of internal con!licts between the states.").
63. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518,538 (1938) ("As territorial
jurisdiction over [Yosemite[ Park was in the United States, the State could .wt legislate
for the area merely on account of the XXI Amendment.").
64. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274 (1984). That the legislative
history of the Twenty-first Amendment in general, and of Section Two in particular, is
unclear or ambiguous is a familiar refrain in nearly all of the commentary on it. Sec, e.g.,
Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at 1631 (cited in note 3) (claiming that the legislative history
"supports three distinct intcrpn:tations of section two"); id. at 1636 (asserting that no
"single, correct interpretation of the effect of the Amendment had on state authority to
regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages following the repeal of Prohibition" is possible
from either text or legislative history); id. at 1659 ("Neither the plain meaning of the text
of the Twenty-first Amendment nor its legislative history resolves whether, and to what
extent, the Amendment created a Dormant Commerce Clause exception for state regulations of commcrc~.: in alcoholic bewrages."); Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 361
(cited in note 27) (stating that "the drafters of the Amendment did not leave a clear record of their intent in including Section Two"); id. at 374 (claiming that "the haste and
festivity of the movement toward repeal obscured the debates in the states") (footnote
omitted); DavidS. Ycrsfelt, Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1578, 1579 (1975) ("Central to
the ambiguity of the twenty-first amendment is its unclear legislative history."); Note,
Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage Laws- Experience Under the Twentyfirst Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147 (1959) (concluding that evidence from congres.~ional debates and state conventions "arc at best inconclusive in showing the purpose
of section 2").
65. See Part II.
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Amendmt:nt limited the exercise of the power granted by the
Twenty-first Amendment.
B. THEMOVEAWAYFROM YOUNG'S MARKET

A generation after Young's Market, however, the Supreme
Court embarked upon a doctrinal course much different than
that charted by Justice Brandeis. The hint of a new direction is
evident as early as 1941, when the Court decided the first of two
cases involving regulations of alcohol shipped through a state,
but not imported into that state for delivery or use. 66 While the
Court upheld the regulations in both cases, it did so based not on
the authority of the Twenty-first Amendment, but rather on the
grounds that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine did not

66. Sec Career v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S.
390 (1941 ). The regulations required, for example, the usc of the most direct routes
through the state, the carrying of bills of lading, the posting of bond, and the identification of the consignees who had to be able to kgally take possession of the alcohol at the
place of delivery. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 133-34; Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 392. Abuses of
the mail-order liquor trade that flourished before passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act and
before the ratification of th<.: Eighteenth Amendment, as well as fear of diversion for illicit usc, were largely responsible for these regulations. Sec Bickel and Schmidt, History
of the Supreme Court at 440 (cited in note 19); Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 69-79, 178-88 (cited in note 13).
One commentator maintains that the "seeds of retreat" were sown in the Ziffrin
case, in which Kentucky's liquor control statute was upheld as applied to liquor manufactured for export, since the case "appeared to apply a reasonableness test" to the regulations. Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over
lmoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 161, 184 (1991).
But there arc problems with this reading of Ziffrin. First, the alcohol being regula:cd
was subject to export, thus the very subject of regulation was not within the text of Section Two, which addressed importation for "delivery or usc therein," not exports. Nevertheless, Justice McReynolds felt that the power exercised by the state flowed from the
Twenty-first Amendment. Sec Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 138 (''The Twenty-first Amendment
sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from
without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause .... Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in
respect of them."). Read in context, Justice McReynolds' usc of the term "reasonably
appropriate" hardly seems intended to restrict state power. Contemporary commentators also read Ziffrin as further expanding the Court's previous broad constructions of
the Twenty-first Amendment. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 17 (cited in note 27)
(remarking that Ziffrin "has made state ... regulatory statutes applicable to liquor within
the state destined for exportation. This decision is in keeping with the general policy followed by the Supreme Court in giving a broad interpretation to the Amendment"); Note,
53 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 62) (restating the logic of !he holding: "because of
the unrestricted power to prohibit imports and the power to forbid manufacture even for
export ... a state may effectively prevent any exportation, and that if it may prohibit, it
may permit such exports subject to any condition it wishes"; though inconsistent with
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, Court able to avoid discussion of doctrine because of the "extensive control over other aspects of the liquor traffic given the states by
Acts of Congress and the Twenty-first Amendment").
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prohibit "reasonable" police measures. 67 At first glance, the
Court's failure to invoke the Twentv-first Amendment seems
understandable. After all, as Justi~e Stone observed, "[t]he
commerce here is transportation alone, there being no question
of sale or use within the state of regulation. " 68
However, as Justices Jackson 69 and Frankfurter pointed out
in their concurring opinions, 70 regulation of cross-shipment was a
reasonable means to prevent diversion of those shipments for instate "delivery or use therein." 71 Though they did not do so explicitly, Frankfurter and Jackson might have reminded their colleagues of Chief Justice Marshall's assertion in McCulloch v.
Maryland that the grant of a power also implicitly granted the
means to effectuate the grant. 72 State regulations of through
67. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 135 ("W.: have recognized that the several slates in the
absence: of federal legislation may require regulatory liccnses for through shipments of
liquor in order to guard agamsl violations of their own laws."); Duckworth, 314 U.S. at
394 ("While thc commerce clause has been interpretcd as reserving to Congress the
power to regulate: interstate: ~ommercc in matters of national importance, that has never
been deemed to exclude the stales from regulating primarily matters of local concern
with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power, even though the regulation
has some effect on interstate commerce.").
68. Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 393.
69. Sec Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring) (''Transportation itself
prescnt.:d no special danger~ or hazards, but it might be a step in evading and undermining a policy as to usc sale of liquor which the slate has a right to prescribe for itself.
Regulated transportation is a necessary incident of regulated consumption and distribution.").
70. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 140-41 (Frankfurter. J., concurring).
71. The legislation is sustainable under the Twenty-first Amendment on one of
two considerations.. . Since we arc dealing with a constitutional amendment
that should be broadly and colloquially interpreted, liquor that enters a State in
the manner in which the liquor h.:re came into Virginia may, without undu.: liberty with the English language, be deemed for "delivery" there even though it is
consigned for another State ..
In th.: alt.:rnativ.:, sine.: Virginia has power to prohibit the importation of
liquor within that Comr.10nwealth, it may effectuate that purpose by measures
deemed by it necessary to prevent evasion of its policy by pretended throughshipments ....
!d. at 140-42 (Frankfurtcr, J, concurring). Justice Jackson warned that by characterizing
the through-shipment regulations as acceptable exercises of stale "police powers," the
Court was sending thc Twcnty-first Amcndmcnt "on [its] way to becoming another ·almost forgotten' clausc of the Constitution.... It certainly applies to nothing else.''
Duckworth, 314 U.S. at399 (Jackson. J., concurring).
72. McCulloch v. Mary/and, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that "the
powers given to the gover~menl imply the ordinary means of execution"). The Court
could also have found support for reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves. 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939), where the Court upheld Kentucky regulations
limiting the transportation of liquor ow of the state without complying with a number of
requirements. "Having power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, sale, transportation, or
possession of intoxicants," the Court concluded, it was "imperative" that the Court allow
the state "to permit these things only under definitely prescribed conditions." Id. It
hardly would have required judicial sorcery to uphold Virginia or Arkansas's regulations
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shipments to prevent diversion, they might have argued, are
"necessary and proper" to the enforcement of states' liquor
laws. 73
The through-shipment cases were important for the future
of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence because
they suggested (pace the Court's earlier decisions) that a state's
regulation of the liquor trade was still partly subject to the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Thereafter,
state regulations not clearly governing importation for delivery
or use were subject to scrutiny for reasonableness. 74 Such qualifications were not lost on academic commentators who urged the
Court to intervene when economic protectionism, rather than
temperance, seemed the primary factor motivating state regulations.75
by extending the reasoning in Ziffrin. In retrospect, Ziffrin was the high water mark of
the Court's willingness to expand the scope of the power granted by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
73. Justice Frankfurter also took the Court to task for assuming the "impossibk
task" of adjudicating, by way of a vague balancing test, the reasonableness of the state's
regulation of its liquor traffic. Carter, 321 U.S. at 143 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Such canons of adjudication," he wrote, "open wide the door of conflict and confusion
which have ... characterized the liquor controversies in this Court and in no small measure formed part of the unedifying history which led first to the Eighteenth and then to
the Twenty-first Amendment." !d. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The introduction
of the balancing test probably owes to the inllucncc of Justice Stone, who wrote the
Duckworth opinion, and who, at the time, was persuading his colleagues on the Court to
applying an all-things-considered balancing test when assessing the validity of state regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Sec, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); sec also Alphcus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske
Scone: Pillar of the Law 490-93 (Viking Press, 1956) (describing the evolution of Stone's
views); Noel T. Dowling,lnterstace Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. I (1940).
74. Moreover, the usc of Justice Stone's emerging balancing test would have important consequences, because Stone suggested in other Commerce Clause cases that his
balancing test should be applied only after determining that the regulations at issue du
not discriminate against out-of-state interests. Sec, e.g., Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at lll4
n.2.
75. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 26 (cited in note 27) (commenting that discriminatory liquor laws "have no perceptible relation to the protection of a dry or regulatory state policy"); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 132-33 (cited in note 27) (discriminatory
liquor laws ought not be shielded from application of unconstitutional conditions duetrine); Note, 55 Yale L.J. at 816 (cited in note 27) (urging "redefinition" of liquor regulation power "grounded on the conception that state liquor legislation escapes the interdict
of the Commerce Clause and other state eonstitutionallimitations only when representing a valid exercise of state police power"; "it would not require boldness beyond the
capacity of the Supreme Court to interpolate the word 'proper' to modify 'laws'" in Section Two) (footnote omitted); Vcrsfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1585 (cited in note 64)
("Plenary state authority over imports was designed to free the states to protect their
citizens from the harmful effects of unregulated imported liquor. The social dangers
which prompted the amendment exist whenever liquor enters a state, regardless of origin.").
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C. HOSTETTER AND lAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING

Justice Jackson's warning that the Twenty-first Amendment
was in danger of becoming another "almost forgotten" clause of
the Constitution was all but confirmed in 1964, when the Court
decided Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation 76
and Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co. 77
On the same day, for the first time in over sixty years (and for
the first time since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment), the Court struck down two state liquor control laws. 78
While purporting to preserve states' core Twenty-first Amendment power over importation, both opinions offered a revisionist
interpretation of the Amendment that is at odds with both its
history and early Supreme Court interpretations. When severely
circumscribing the very state power the Court left undisturbed,
lower courts now quote liberally from these cases.
Hostetter arose when the State of New York attempted to
shut down a duty-free liquor store ("Idlewild") that operated out
of John F. Kennedy International Airport. 79 Idlewild purchased
its inventory from bonded warehouses located outside New
York State, then had it delivered to Idlewild where the alcohol
was stored until sale. 80 Idlewild's purchase and storage of alco76. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
77. 377 u.s. 341 (1964).
78. Sec generally Note, The Evolving Scope of Stale Power Under the Twenty-first
Amendmem: The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 759 (1965). Most commentators
agree that both cases marked a watershed moment in the Court's interpretation of the
Twenty-first Amendment. Sec, e.g., Shanker, 85 Ya. L. Rev. at 372 (cited in note 3) (describing Hostetter as an "unequivocal repudiation" of the Young's Market line of cases);
Spaeth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 185 (cited in note 66) (decisions "consummated a full retreat
from earlier broad readings'' of the Amendment); hut sec Note, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. at
760, 776 (cited in note 78) (suggesting that "the historic unrestrained state power over
liquor has not been substanually affected" and that decisions represent neither "a departure from the Court's traditional refusal to prevent states form erecting economic harriers to interstate commerce m liquor"). In fairness to the author of the Rutgers Note.
Hostetter's importance became clearer only after later Court cases. As late as 1975, another student commentator was able to qualify the observation that Justice Stewart's lan·uage "may suggest that the federal-state relationship should he n.:examined" on a case·
oy-casc basis to balance state interests under the Twenty-first Amendment with federal
interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, with the remark that
Stewart's language '·should be read with [Hostetter's] peculiar facts in mind." Ycrsfclt, 75
Colum. L. Rev. at 1594 (cited in note 64).
79. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 325.
80. Idlewild sold only to "departing international airline travelers" whose "tickets
and boarding cards indicate[d] their imminent departure." !d. at 325. At time of purchase, "a customer [got] nothing but a receipt .... The liquor which he orders is transferred directly to the departing aircraft on documents approved by United States Customs" and was then "delivered to the customer [when] he arrive[d] at his foreign
destination." !d.
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hal were made pursuant to regulations of the U.S. Customs Service, which had "inspected [Idlewild's] place of business and explicitly approved its proposed method of operations." 81 When
New York determined that Idlewild's business violated state law,
it sought an injunction to close it. Idlewild responded by filing
suit, claiming that the injunction violated the Commerce
Clause. 82 The Court agreed with Idlewild, holding that New
York had no power to close the duty-free shop. 83
Justice Potter Stewart began by acknowledging that the
Amendment and the Court's previous decisions "unquestion[ ably]" free a state from the Commerce Clause's strictures
when the state restricted the importation of liquor "destined for
use, distribution, or consumption within its borders, " 84 citing
Young's Market, Indianapolis Brewing Co., and Joseph Triner
Corporation, among other cases. But, Justice Stewart claimed,
the facts here were different. As he characterized the issue, the
Court was asked to decide
whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far obliterates the
Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely the passage of liquor through its territory, under the supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for delivery to customers in foreign
85
countries.

To draw from these cases the conclusion, he wrote, "that the
Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the
Commerce Clause" in cases involving liquor "would ... be an
absurd oversimplification." 86 That would mean that "Congress
would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign
commerce in intoxicating liquor," a result Stewart found to be
"patently bizarre" and "demonstrably incorrect." 87
He went on to say that "[b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution" and "each must be considered in the light of the other." 88
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 326.
ld. at 327.
Id. at 328.
84. ld. at 330.
85. Id. at 329 (footnol\.: omitted).
86. Id. at 331-32.
87. ld. at 332 (citing Jameson & Co. v. Morganthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939)
(per curiam)). Morganthau was a citing a per curiam decision in which the Court upheld
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act against a claim that the Twenty-first Amendment gave States exclusive control over liquor.
88. !d.
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New York's attempt to bar Idlewild from doing business he
compared with California's earlier, unsuccessful attempt to prohibit shipments of liquor through the state that were destined for
Yosemite National Park, a federal enclave. 89 This led Stewart to
"a like conclusion" because "ultimate delivery and use is not in
New York but in a foreign country" and New York "has not
sought to regulate or control the passage of intoxicants through
her territory" to prevent diversion. 90 "Rather, the State has
sought totally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis
of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit
power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations. This New
York cannot constitutionally do. " 91
Note the difference that rephrasing the question made. Justice Stewart conceded that if the issue was merely state regulation of imports for delivery or use in New York, the state would
have prevailed under the Young's Market line of cases. However, he avoided the Young's Market precedents (i) by claiming
that through-shipment, not importation, was involved; (ii) by
implying that New York's liquor laws were to some degree preempted by the federal customs regulations enacted; and (iii) by
implying that the involvement of the Customs Bureau converted
JFK into some sort of federal enclave.
Yet, upon close examination, it becomes apparent that if
there are any "patently bizarre" conclusions and "absurd oversimplifications" in Hostetter, they are contained in Justice Stewart's opinion. First, Justice Stewart utterly mischaracterized the
nature of Idlewild's operation. While it might be true that no
liquor was bought by Idlewild for "use" in New York (since presumably any use would take place at the final destination, when
the liquor was claimed by the purchaser), there was "delivery,"
for purposes of Section Two of the Amendment, of the liquor to
Idlewild's warehouse, where it sat as inventory until purchased
and loaded onto international flights. 92
89. !d. at 332-33 (discussing Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518
( 1938) ); sec also note 63 and accompanying text.
90. !d. at 333.
91. !d. at 334.
92. Compare Justiw Black's description of Idlewild's business:
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation ... buys wines and intoxicating liquors from bonded wholesale warehouses, brings them into the State of New
York, and sells them at retail in the John F. Kennedy Airport.... Idlewild
keeps a stock of liquor in New York ... and customers come into Idlewild's
shop, choose the kind of liquor they want, and pay for 1t. These retail sales arc
just like sales made by New York's hccnscd and regulated hquor dealers, wnh a
single difference .... Idlewild arranges with its customers to put their pur-

2002]

SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT

319

Then there is Stewart's discussion of the relationship between the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
To frame the question in terms of the Amendment's "repealing"
the Commerce Clause clouds the issue. The evidence seems
clear that, inasmuch as the importation of alcohol is involved,
the Twenty-first Amendment created an "exception" to the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 93 It was that doctrine, after
all, that earlier Courts had used to frustrate state regulation of
the alcohol trade. 94 The source of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, moreover, is the delegation of power over
commerce to Congress in Article I, § 8. So, in one sense, the
Twenty-first Amendment did effect a "repeal" of at least some
95
of the Commerce Clause's implicit limits on state power.
chases ... aboard planes so that the customers take physical possession of the
liquor ... at destinations abroad.
!d. at334 (Black. J., dissenting).
93. Sec Part II.
94. Sec notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
95. This understanding was shared by state courts and lower federal courts in the
years preceding Hostetler. Sec, e.g.. Chicago's Last Dep 't Store v. Indiana Alcoholic Bev.
Comm 'n, 161 F. Supp. I, 4 (N.D. Ind. IY58) ("If the State has the prerogative and right to
narrow and control traffic of alcoholic and spiritous beverages which arc in the flow of
commerce passing through the Stale, then the State must assuredly have the power to
regulate the importation and transportation of alcoholic beverages into the State. The
lesser power is included within the greal<:r power."); Georgia v. Wenger, Y4 F. Supp. Y76,
Y81 (E.D. Ill. IY50) ("Both by history and by judicial interpretation in the light of history
the intended scope and purpose of [the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon
Act] is to divest liquor in interstate commerce of its interstate character so as to deprive
it of all immunity from state control."); United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. I, 7
(W.D.S.C. 1Y44) ("So the Twenty-first Amendment made the laws as to delivery and usc
in the state of destination the test of kgality of interstate movement. This obviously
gives to state law a much greater control over interstate liquor traffic than over commerce in any other commodity."); General Sales & Liquor Co. v. Becker, 14 F. 348, 350
(E. D. Mo. IY36) ("The adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment has without doubt limited and qualified the commerce clause to the extent that state laws, regulating the importation of liquor into a state, place no prohibited burden upon commerce."); PremierPabst Sales Corporarion v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp.Y70, Y72 (E. D. Penn. IY35) ("Under the
Twenty-first Amendment when a state passes a law upon the subject of the importation
of intoxicating liquors all importation in violation of that law is forbidden by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The state of Pennsylvania has passed such a law
and all imports of intoxicating liquors in violation of that law arc forbidden."); Joseph
Triner Corp. v. Arundel, II F. Supp. 145, 147 (D. Minn. 1Y35) (holding that the Amendment "left the states, territories, and posscssil•ns free to determine to what extent, if at
all, intoxicating liquor should h.: a lawful subject of commerce within their limits");
Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, liD A.2d 64, 67 (N.J. IY62) (holding that "the [Twentyfirst] Amendment sanctions th.: right of a state to legislate concerning alcoholic beverages brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause, and bestowed upon the
states broad regulatory powers over the liquor traffic within their borders."); Scare v.
Kilgore, 103 S.E.2d 321, 322 (S.C lY58) ("Since the adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment, each state has power, unfettered by the commerce clause, to regulate or
prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquor for delivery or usc within its borders.'');
Pompei Winery, Inc. , .. Bd. Liquor Conrrol, 146 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio 1Y57) ("'The liq-
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uor industry of the entire nation was divested of ... constitutional guaranties (sic)
[against state regulation] when it was divested of legal existence by the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the Twenty-first Amendment
cannot be said to have returned to the liquor industry any of the protection and guaranties (sic) which may have existed prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.");
Welborn v. Morley, 243 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Ark. 1951) (holding that "regulation in interstate commerce by local authority in the absence of Congressional action is admissible to
protect the state from injuries arising from that commerce" under the Amendment);
Capitol Distributing Co. eta/. v. Redwine, 57 S.E. 2d 578, 585 (Ga. 1950) ("If the portion
of the act is discriminatory, it is outside the pale of protection of the due-process and
equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution by reason of the Twenty-first Amendment thereof."); Atkins v.
Manning, 56 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 1949) (holding that the "twenty-first Amendment removes spiritous liquors and alcohol from the protection of the commerce clause to the
extent necessary to allow the States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent.");
State v. Hall, 30 S.E.2d 158, 162 (N.C. 1944) ("Both by the Constitution of the United
States (Amendment XXI), and the state statutes liquor has been placed in a category in
some respects different from that of other articles of commerce, and the State's regulations aimed at the suppression of its prohibited transportation and unlawful possession
should not be held obnoxious to the interstate commerce clause of the United States
Constitution unless clearly in conflict with granted Federal powers and congressional action thereunder.'"); Superior Distributing Co. v. Davis, 7 N.E. 2d. 652, 655 (Ohio 1937)
("It is the position of the state upon the issue presented that, by reason of the adoption of
the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the several states now have
complete power and full authority to prohibit shipment of intoxicating beverages into
each such state and hence may provide and enforce any regulation of such traffic without
limitation or restraint."; rejecting defendant's claim that permit fee was invalid because it
did not promote the health or safety of state citizens); State v. Arluno, 268 N.W. 179, 188
(Iowa 1936) (holding that "under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution all importation of intoxicating liquor in violation of the Iowa law is forbidden.");
Grillo v. State, 120 A.2d 384, 387 (Ct. App. Md. 1956) ("The Twenty-first Amendment,
which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, sanctions the right of a State to legislate
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without the State, unfettered by the Commerce Clause."); Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 92 A.2d 560, 564 (Ct. App. Md. 1952)
("'If a State for its own sufficient reasons deems it a desirable policy to standardize the
price of liquor within its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by permissive
sanction of such price-fixing in order to discourage the temptations of cheap liquor due
to cutthroat competition, the Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power and the
Commerce Clause does not gainsay it."); Schwartz v. Kelley, 18 Conn. Supp. 59, 65
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1952) ("The attack on the law as a violation of the commerce clause of
the federal constitution finds no support in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. In a series of cases it has been firmly established that since the twenty-first
amendment, the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; nor are state regulations discriminating
against imported liquor prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."); Edelbrew Brewery, Inc. v. Weiss, 84 A.2d 371, 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951)
("Sales by outside brewers to Pennsylvania brewers are not protected by the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution"); Ajax Distribwors v. Springer, 22 A.2d 838,841 (Ct.
Ch. Del. 1941) (holding that "under the Federal Constitution, since the adoption of the
Twenty-first Amendment, the possible scope of local tax statutes, or of other legislation
of a regulatory or even of a prohibitory nature, affecting intoxicating liquors, is quite
broad"). But sec Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motortruck, 187 A. 461, 471 (Pa. Super.
Ct.) ("We arc of opinion, that this Commonwealth, in adopting and promulgating its system for regulation, restraint and control of intoxicating liquors, in the exercise of its police power, had the right and authority to provide that it should be unlawful for any one
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Stewart was correct when he wrote that "if the commodity involved here were not liquor, but grain or lumber, the Commerce
Clause, would clearly deprive New York" of its regulatory
power. 96 His observation, however, isn't relevant to the constitutionality of New York's regulation of Idlewild. New York
sought to regulate the importation of alcohol; and alcohol, the
Twenty-first Amendment makes clear, is different.
Is it "absurd" to conclude that Congress's commerce power
was qualified by the Twenty-first Amendment as it would be by
other J?rovisions of the Constitution, like the First Amendment? Suppose that Congress exercised its commerce power in
an attempt to force states to accept imports of intoxicating beverages, regardless of what state law said. Would that congressional act preempt contrary state law? If the Amendment was
intended to mean anything, the answer to the question just
posed must be "no." The proper question, then, is not whether
Congress is stripped of its commerce power, but rather whether
its commerce power is trumped by the Amendment when a congressional act conflicts with state regulation of liquor, especially
regulations dealing with importation. 98
Justice Stewart also suggested that New York was preempted by federal law from regulating Idlewild. To him, the
state's attempt to regulate a business that was operating under
federal Customs Bureau supervision presented a conflict be-

to transport intoxicating liquors within this state without a permit from the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board. provided the regulation adopted is reasonable and nondiscriminawry and is rea,_-.mably calculated to effect the purpose in view .. _") (emphasis
added).
96. Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 329.
97. Imagine that Congress passed a law prohibiting the shipment of printed materials critical of the United States government in interstate commerce. Would it be "absurd" to say in such case that the First Amendment had "repealed" the Commerce
Clause to the extent necessary to protect freedom of speech?
98. Two of Stewart's other arguments employed to prevent Idlewild's closure arc
non-sequiturs. The Court's brief decision upholding the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (2000 Supp.), which Stewart cites in support of his contention
that the Congress's commerce power remained intact, did not purport to authorize alcohol shipments otherwise forbidden by state law. Moreover, Stewart's citation to Collins
was also of no relevance to the case: the airport was not a federal enclave over which the
federal government could claim dominion. Sec Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 334-35 (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("The airport where the sales take place is not a federal enclave where even
as to liquor federal law can constitutionally control, but is New York territory subject to
New York, not federal jurisdiction."); Collins v_ Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S.
518, 538 (1938). Commentators have mistakenly claimed that the warehouse was a federal enclave_ Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings ConsL L.Q_ at 377 (cited in note 27) ("The
unique facts in Idlewild- the presence of a federal enclave in the same physical space as
a state facility-required a balancing of the federal and state regulating interests.")-
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tween federal and state authority. 99 But Justice Stewart's reference to Idlewild's federal sanction is maddeningly vague. His
only statutory citation is to a provision of the Tariff Act of
1930, 100 which deals with duty-free exports from "bonded manufacturing warehouses" in general, and says nothing about preempting state authority where alcohol is involved. 101 This statute
was passed two years before the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, and does not explicitly permit importation and
storage of goods in bonded warehouses regardless of state law.
One might also question whether it should be construed to preempt state laws passed pursuant to a later constitutional
amendment.
Stewart's obtuseness is further evidenced in Hostetter's
companion case, Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Dis102
tilling Co., decided on the same day. At issue was a Kentucky
tax of ten cents on imported liquor, as applied to shipments of
whiskey imported from Scotland. 103 The importer challenged
the tax as a violation of the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution;104 the State claimed the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense. While conceding that it was consistent with the ImportExport Clause for Kentucky to "regulate" or "completely prohibit the importation of some intoxicants" or "to regulate and
control, by taxation or otherwise, the distribution, use, or consumption of intoxicants within her territory after they have been
imported," 105 the Court nevertheless invalidated the tax.
Though the Twenty-first Amendment makes no distinction between liquor imported from other states and that imported from
abroad, the Court held that "[t]his Court has never so much as
intimated that the Twenty-first Amendment has operated to
permit what the Export-Import Clause precisely and explicitly
forbids." 106
99. Sec Hostetler, 377 U.S. at 329 (framing the issue of one in which the state is attempting ''to prohibit absolutely the passage or liquor through its territory, under the
supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for delivery to consumers in foreign countries") (footnote omitted); Bittker, Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce at 13 (cited in note 12) (commenting that Stewart's reliance
on the statute and regulations "suggests that [the case] was a federal preemption case").
100. Sec 19 U.S.C. ~ 1311 (1994). The section number is the same as it was in 1964.
101. Neither could I find any regulations in effect presently or in 1964, which addressed the effect of the provision on state laws.
102. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
103. !d. at342.
104. Sec U.S. Const., Art. I,* 10, cl. 2.
105. James B. Beam Disci/ling Co., 377 U.S. at 344.
106. !d. at 344; sec also id. at 345-46 ("[n]othing in the language of the Amendment
nor in its history leads to [the] extraordinary conclusion" that "the Twenty-first Amend-
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Justice Stewart never explains just why the near-total control of alcohol under Section Two could not have qualified the
Import-Export Clause's flat prohibition. Arguably the Amendment necessarily qualified that Clause, just as it had rendered
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine inapplicable to the interstate liquor trade. 107 Furthermore, Stewart never adequately
accounted for statements made in the Court's previous cases,
which declare in no uncertain terms the right of states to tax imported alcohol however they wished. Those cases also held the
Fourteenth Amendment could operate as no restraint on the
states in light of the Twenty-first, though the framers had not
given the Amendment's relationship with the Fourteenth
Amendment much thought either.
Finally, the opinion in James B. Beam Distillers was inconsistent with a 1958 case in which the Supreme Court sustained
the conviction of defendants charged with bringing rum into
Texas from Mexico without paying state taxes. 108 The Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion merely affirmed the state conviction,
citing only the Twenty-first Amendment and Carter v. Virginia.109 Stewart explained away Gordon with a reference to the
trial court's finding that the tax in that case was not levied on
importation. 110 As Justice Black pointed out in his dissent, however, "these labels cannot obscure the fact that both in Gordon
and in this case the same conduct was involved: the physical importation of liquor from abroad into the State, at which point the
State's interest in regulating or taxing the liquor came into play.
Gordon did not-just as the Twenty-first Amendment does
not-draw nice distinctions about where the imported liquor
comes from. " 111

ment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants arc concerned").
107. Sec also Versfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1584-85 (cited in note 64) (noting that,
as neither the text of the Amendment nor the history of its ratification makes any distinction regarding the source of the liquor, "[i]t would not ... have been so 'extraordinary' to
conclude that the twenty-first amendment had 'repealed' the export-import clause with
respect to intoxicants"); id. at 1585 ("The export-import clause's singular concern with
shipments from abroad cannot distinguish it from the commerce clause, for the latter applies to foreign as well as domestic commerce.'').
108. Sec Gordon v. Texas, 310 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S.
369 (1958) (per curiam).
I 09. Gordon v. Texas, 355 U.S. 369, 369 (1958) (per curiam) ("The judgment is affirmed. Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.").
110. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. at345.
Ill. !d. at 349 (Black. J., dissenting).
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If the ambi~uity introduced by the Court in the throughtransport cases' I- can be excused because the state regulations at
issue did not directly address issues of "importation for delivery
or use," Justice Stewart's two opinions are harder to explain.
Stewart introduced uncertainty in cases squarely within the ambit of the Amendment's text, whose facts were indistinguishable
from the Court's previous cases. While perhaps Hostetter could
be understood as a preemption case, Justice Stewart's opinion
seemed unwilling to put too much weight on that argument. Nor
have subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions read
the case so narrowly. Moreover, James B. Beam Distilling Co.'s
dubious conclusion that the Amendment did not empower states
to regulate foreign importation represented an abrupt about face
from Gordon.

D. POST-HOSTETTER SUPREME COURT CASES
Subsequent opinions exploited this ambiguity and constructed an alternative line of cases. Those opinions built neither on Young's Market and its progeny, nor on the text and intent of the Twenty-first Amendment itself. Rather, they relied
on the statements from Hostetter and James B. Bean Distilling
that the power of the Twenty-first Amendment could be subordinated to other provisions of the Constitution, since both were
"parts of the same Constitution" and that "each must be considered in the light of the other." These recent cases are selective
in their quotations, however, and ignore Stewart's concession
that a state was "unquestion[ably]" freed from the Commerce
Clause when restricting the importation of liquor "destined for
use, distribution, or consumption within its borders." 113
Cases decided after Hostetter continued to limit the use of
the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense against challenges to
state liquor laws. State drinking ages that applied different standards to men and women; 114 so-called "price affirmation" statutes that pegged in-state sales prices to the price at which liquor
is sold in other states; 115 and restrictions on advertising were all
I 12. Sec notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
113. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330.
114. S~.:c Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (turning aside a Twenty-first
Amendment defense to a state law that authorized the sale of reduced alcohol beer to
women at age 18, but not to men; "( o ]nee passing beyond consideration of the Commerce
Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions
becomes increasingly doubtful").
115. Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1988); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
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struck down. 116 Nevertheless, each of these cases also contained
language affirming the vast powers that the Twenty-first
Amendment granted states to regulate alcohol, and stating that
the Amendment removed Commerce Clause restrictions from
that exercise. 117 But two decisions in particular further eroded
whatever state power remained under the Twenty-first Amendment. They are often quoted, along with Hostetter, in recent
lower court opinions striking down state liquor regulation laws.
In 1980, the Court held that a California anti-competitive
liquor pricing system could not be sustained under the Twentyfirst Amendment. 118 Writing for a majority, Justice Powell began his analysis of the state's Twenty-first Amendment defense
to the Sherman Act claim on an oddly apologetic note, "In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment," he
wrote, "the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history behind it." 119 The language of
the Amendment, Powell conceded, not only granted power over
transportation and importation of liquor into states, but the
Court's own early cases had also granted states "considerable
regulatory power not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. " 120
"Subsequent decisions," however, "have
stressed that important federal interests in liquor matters," expressed in the Import-Export Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "survived the ratification
of the Twenty-first Amendment." 121
Though Congress's power to regulate liquor under the
Commerce Clause "is directly qualified by § 2," Powell went on
to explain that "the Federal Government retains some Commerce Clause authority over liquor," the contours of which
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
116. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Sec also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (stating that the Twenty-first Amendment docs not
insulate stat<.: laws from Due Process Clause scrutiny).
117. Sec, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 584 (stating that the Twenty-first
Amendment "gives the States wide latitude to regulat<.: the importation and distribution
of liquor within their territories"); id. at 585 ("New York has a valid constitutional interest in regulating sales of liquor within the territory of New York."); Craig, 429 U.S. at
205-06 ("This Court's decisions since have confirmed that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."); id. at 215 ("Every
State has broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to control the dispensation of
alcoholic beverages within its borders.") (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
119. ld. at 106-07.
120. !d. at 107.
121. !d. at 108.
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"were sharpened in [Hostetter]." 122 Quoting its admonition that
the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause had to
be interpreted in light of one another and in the "context of the
issues and interests ... in any concrete case," 123 Powell concluded that Hostetter represented a "pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers" in conflicts like that presented by
the state pricing scheme and the Sherman Act. 124
Justice Powell's own pragmatic harmonization of the challenged statute and the Sherman Act resulted in a diminution of
state power. "[T]here is no bri¥:ht line between federal and state
powers over liquor," he wrote. 25 State controls imposed on liquor, at least those not directly related to importation, "may be
subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations.
The competing state and federal interests can be reconciled onl.;,;
after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a 'concrete case."' u
Without explaining why a constitutional amendment must give
way to a statute, the Court endorsed the state court's view that
"the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national
policy in favor of competition [expressed in the Sherman
Act]." 127
Four years later, Justice Brennan formalized Powell's apparent balancing test in a case involving an Oklahoma law that
prohibited the broadcast of certain advertisements for alcoholic
beverages. 128 Upholding a challenge by a cable company that
transmitted out-of-state signals into Oklahoma, the Court found
that the Oklahoma law was preempted by FCC regulations. 129
The Court specifically rejected the State's suggestion that the
Twenty-first Amendment insulated its statute from invalidation.
While conceding that "States enjoy broad power under § 2
of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and
use of intoxicating liquors within their borders," Justice Brennan
wrote that cases like Midcal "have made clear that the Amend-

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

ld. at 109.
ld. (quoting Hosteuer, 377 U.S. at 332).
ld.
ld at 110.
!d.
127. !d. at 113. The Court added that it "need not consider whether the legitimate
state interests in temperance and the protcctiof! of small retailers ever could prevail
against the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy," because "[t]hc unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case simply arc not or the same stature as the
goals of the Sherman Act." !d. at 113-14.
128. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
129. !d. at 708.
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ment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under
other provisions of the Constitution. " 13 ° Cases like Hostetter and
Midcal demonstrate that "the Federal Government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate even interstate commerce in liquor." 131 To resolve conflicts between the
federal and state governments, the Court must evaluate
"whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so
closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first
Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding
that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policics."132 On balance, the Court found Oklahoma's interests in
regulating out-of-state transmissions and the selectivity of the
ban (which covered wine, but not beer) wanting: "when ... a
state regulation squarely conflicts with the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the State's central power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the
times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported
and sold is not directly implicated," the balance tips in favor of
the federal government. 133
That same year, the Court held that Hawaii could not exempt a locally-produced liquor from an otherwise generallyapplicable twenty percent excise tax, 134 subjecting a state alcohol
regulation to the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis the
Twenty-first Amendment was intended to disable. In Bacchus
Imports Ltd. v. Dias, Justice White acknowledged that the
Young's Market line of cases contained "broad language," but
went on to say that the Court had come to "recognize[] the obscurity of the legislative history of§ 2" and that "[n]o clear consensus concerning the meaning of the provision is apparent." 135
Whatever the intent or early cases indicated, Justice White continued, "[i]t is by now clear that the Amendment did not entirely
remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of
the Commerce Clause." 136 Citing Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, White concluded that "one thing is certain" about the
Amendment: "The central purpose of the provision was not to
130. Id. at 712. Perhaps Justice Brennan forgot that Midcal concerned a conOict not
between two constitutional provisions, hut rather between the Sherman Act and the
Amendment.
131. ld.at713.
132. !d. at 714.
133. !d. at 716.
134. Bacchus Imports, Led. v. Dias, 46/l US. 263 (1LJX4).
135. !d. at 274.
136. !d. at 275.
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empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition. . . . State laws that constitute mere economic
protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as
laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted
traffic in liquor." 137
Until Bacchus, the Court had neither limited the right of
states to set the terms upon which alcohol could be imported
into the state, nor suggested that the Commerce Clause limited
the state's regulation of alcohol within the state. Even Capital
Cities Cable affirmed the state's power in this regard. With no
historical or textual support, Justice White simply announced
that the dormant Commerce Clause in fact did apply to the state
alcohol regulations, despite the Twenty-first Amendment. 138
Some of these decisions might again be defended on the
grounds that the state regulations at issue (the pricing statutes
and the discriminatory drinking age, for example) had little to do
with regulating importation for delivery or use. However, the
Court did not make this distinction clear, instead further muddying the waters with broad statements suggesting that "temperance" was the only legitimate goal of state liquor regulation, and
that any regulation smacking of economic protectionism was per
se outside the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment.

137. !d. at 276. As I have argued, the ambiguity that Justice White finds in the
Amendment's legislative hist01y is of his own making. Moreover, the Young's Markee
line of cases squarely refutes the claim of an "economic protectionism" exception to the
Twenty-first Amendment. Yet, after muddying the waters in Hosleller, James B. Beam
Disci/ling, and Midcal, the Court apparently thought that its sub silenlo abandonment of
Young's Markee required no further explanation or justification.
138. One commentator observed that "[d]cspite assertions to the contrary, the Bacchus Court went beyond the Section Two precedents and found a new interpretation of
the meaning or Section Two itself." Freeman, 13 Hastings Canst. L.Q. at 382 (cited in
note 27). Despite the author's dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the majority's opinion, he approved of its conclusion. !d. at 386-87. According to the author of this comment, the drafters of the Twenty-first Amendment thought that it went no farther than
the Webb-Kenyon Act, id. at 384; that the Amendment was merely intended to protect
dry states, id.; and that the defeat of the proposed Section Three had no effect on the
scope of Section Two. !d. at 384-85. The author presents little evidence to support his
conclusions.
Justice Brennan, whose opinion in Capica/ Cicies Cable made clear that states still
possessed tremendous power over imported liquor and its distribution within the state,
did not participate in Bacchus Imporcs.
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I ' ~ . STATE LIQUOR LAWS AND INTERNET
7

ALCOHOL SALES: RECENT CASES
The full effect of the post-Hostetter decisions-especially
the uncritical certitude of Bacchus that economic protectionism
was beyond the pale of the Twenty-first Amendment-is apparent in recent lower court cases striking down state regulations of
liquor imports. These initial victories will, no doubt, encourage
many more similar lawsuits against state liquor regulations. District courts, the courts of appeals, and, perhaps, the Supreme
Court will be called upon to de(:ide these cases and, thus, will decide whether the Twenty-first Amendment will be truly a "forgotten clause" of the Constitution. After reviewing these recent
decisions, and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that
recently affirmed state power exercised under the Twenty-first
Amendment, the following section suggests approaches that
both the lower courts and the Supreme Court should take in future cases.
In Dickerson v. Bailey, 139 a federal district court judge
struck down a Texas statute that prohibited the importation of
more than three gallons of wine without a permit unless the resident p,ersonally accompanied the wine or liquor as it entered the
state. 40 The district court, applying the "virtually per se rule of
invalidity" 141 to which discriminatory laws are subject under traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, found that the
statute "facially discriminates against out-of-state vintners and
wine shippers" in order to "protect[ ] ... in-state liquor wholesalers and retailers at the expense of out-of-state wine sellers." 142
The Court rejected the State's claim that the Twenty-first
Amendment authorized the law. Earlier decisions, like Young's
Market, the judge wrote, had given way to a "balancing approach" in which the courts were no longer to assume that "the
twenty-first amendment in essence repealed the commerce
clause where liquor regulation was concerned." This new approach restricted the Amendment's "core" powers over transportation and importation where regulation is undertaken for
the purpose of economic protectionism. 143 The court put great
139. 87 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
140. !d. at 693; sec also id. at 691 (citing Tex. Alcohol Bcv. Code 107.7 (Vernon
1995)).
141. Sec Bittkcr, Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce at* 6.06[AJ (cited
in note 12).
142. Dickerson, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
143. Id. at 706-07. The judge seemed to find no inconsistency between his applica-
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stress on language from Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, and
understood cases like Bacchus Imports to have grafted an "economic ,grotectionism" exception onto the Twenty-first Amendment.1
In a similar case proceeding through a federal district court
in New York, a judge recently dismissed the State's motion to
dismiss a challenge to New York's direct shipment and advertising ban. 145 Citing the "evolution in Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence" since 1970 when the state statute withstood a similar challenge, the district court felt that "it would be
inappropriate" to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence in support of their claims that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause. 1"6 Again, Midcal Aluminum and Bacchus

Lion of a "per sc rule of invalidity" and his description of recent Twenty-first Amendment
cases as requiring a "balancing approach."
144. Sec id. at 705 (citing Hosteuer's statement that it was "patently absurd" to argue
that the Amendment n:pealcd the Commerce Clause); id. at 706 (citing Midcal for the
proposition that "the relationship and effect on each other of federal and state interests"
had to be weighed; that "there is no bright line between federal and state powers over
liquor"; and Hosteuer's language that since both the Amendment and the Commerce
Clause were parts of the same Constitution, each needed to be considered in light of the
other), 707 (citing Bacchus Imports for the proposition that courts "have increasingly
emphasized federal intcn;sts and more carefully scrutinized the actual purpose behind
the state's law'' as opposed to deferring "to the amendment's express grant of virtually
complete control to the states over importation and sale of liquor and structuring of a
liquor distribution system within their own borders").
Following Judge Easterbrook's decision in Bridenbaugh, the district judge in
Dickerson reconsidered the initial grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff, but affirmed the initial grant of the plaintiff's motion. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 694-95.
The court reviewed the recent cases, considered Judge Easterbrook's decision, and concluded that the recent deciswns of the Supreme Court and binding precedent in the Fifth
Circuit compelled its decision. ld. at 692-93. The Fifth Circuit decision cited by the court
was Cooper \'. McBeath, II F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994), in which the court struck down a
Texas law requiring a three-year durational residency requirement as a precondition for
obtaining a liquor permit under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Fifth Circuit repeated the usual statements from Hosteller and Bacchus about the Twenty-first
Amendment not protecting economic protectionism, and the need to reconcile the
Commerce Clause with the Twenty-first Amendment. One might distinguish the situation in Cooper from that in Dickerson on the ground that the grant or denial of liquor
permits is not closely related to the regulation of the importation of liquor for delivery or
usc in a state. Sec also Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d
1234, 1246-47 (D. Kan. 2001) (striking down a ten-year residency requirement for alicense to distribute liquor).
145. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 200.) WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y) (Sept. 5, 2000), at *1. The
ban prohibited any advertisement or solicitation for sale of alcoholic beverages without
being licensed by the state, as well as in-state shipment, by common carrier or otherwise,
of alcoholic beverages other than to consignees licensed by the state. ld. (citing N.Y. Alcohol and Bev. Control Law§§ 102(1)(a), (c), and (d)).
146. Id. at *7. The court "hasten[cd[ to add," in a footnote, that its denial of the motion to dismiss "is in no way [a] ruling ... upon the ultimate merits of the parties' respective claims." ld. at *7 n.l6.
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Imports figured prominently in the court's conclusion that a
jurisprudential "evolution" had taken place. 147
Finally, there is Bridenbraugh v. O'Bannon, 148 which was
the first case to strike down, on dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grounds. In Bridenbraugh, state law outlawed the shipment of alcoholic beverages into the state to anyone except
wholesalers, specifically including sales over the Internet. 149 In a
brief opinion, the district judge dismissed the argument that the
Twenty-first Amendment authorized Indiana's law. The court
took "judicial notice of the historic setting of [the] Amendment"
and asserted that "the second section of [the] Amendment had
as its legislative purpose to permit states to regulate by local option, or indeed enforce statewide prohibition in regard to alcoholic beverages." 150 But neither of those goals, the judge continued, had "any bearing whatsoever to this case." The judge
instead applied a balancing test: "whether the interests implicated by a state's regulation are so closely related to the powers
reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail,
notwithstanding the fact that its requirements directly conflict
with express federal policy. " 151 The only core principle protected by the Twenty-first Amendment is temperance, the judge
concluded; because the Indiana statute facially discriminated
against interstate commerce and was not obviouslr related to
temperance, it had to yield to the Commerce Clause. )2

147. Sec id. at *5, *6 & n.11. The district court recently granted summary judgment
to the plaintiffs who challenged the New York laws, concluding that the "Defendants
have not shown that New York's ban on the direct shipment of out-of-state wine, and
particularly the in-state exceptions to the ban, implicate the State's core concerns [i.e.,
the promotion of temperance] under the Twenty-first Amendment." Swedenburg v.
Kelly, 2002 WL 31521023, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
148. 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999), rev'd sub. nom., Bridenbaugh v. FreemanWilson, 2lXJO WL 1286249 (7th Cir. 2lXJO).
149. Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at829 & n.2 (citing Ind. Stat.§ 7. 1-5-11-1.5).
150. !d. at 831. The judge adduced no historical evidence to support what he asserted to be the clear purpose of* 2. Compare Part II.
151. ld.
152. !d. at 831-32. Other district court decisions follow the trend of the other district
courts in striking down aspects of state liquor shipment laws. See Beskind v. Easley, 197
F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2lXJ2);
Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2001 ). These
cases held that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shield to "protectionist" state
laws imposing different requirements on in-state and out-of-state alcohol manufacturers.
See Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 474 ("Economic protectionism is not the purpose of this
safe harbor [i.e., the Twenty-first Amendment] from the Commerce Clause."); Bolick,
199 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17 (accepting magistrate judge's finding that aspects of Virginia's
alcohol control statutes were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and that the Twenty-first Amendment provided no defense for the state).
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All of the district court opinions share a common flaw: They
give unduly broad readings to Supreme Court opinions that do
not directly address issues of state regulation of importation of
alcohol, then proceed to apply them to situations covered by the
express language of the Amendment. For example, as unconvincing as his distinction might have been, Justice Stewart took
pains to characterize the arrangement in Hostetter as one not involving "importation ... for delivery or use therein" to avoid falling squarely within the Amendment's language and the Court's
own prior cases. 153 Similarly, Midcal Aluminum turned on
whether California's discriminatory pricing scheme- as opposed
to regulations of alcohol imports-was protected by the Twentyfirst Amendment. 154 Even Bacchus Imports involved a question-whether Hawaii could offer a tax exemption to an otherwise generally-applicable tax for locally-produced liquor-much
different than those posed by the recent cases, which strike at
the very heart of what Midcal and Capital Cities Cable did not
presume to question: the power of states to structure their liquor
importation systems.
The confusion in the lower courts received a welcome corrective when the Seventh Circuit unanimously overturned the
district court's decision in Bridenbraugh. 155 Writing for the
court, Judge Easterbrook recognized that "§ 2 of the twenty-first
amendment empowers Indiana to control alcohol in ways that it
cannot control cheese" under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. 156 Rejecting the "core purpose" argument adopted by
the district courts, and relying on the text and history of the provision, Judge Easterbrook concluded that, after the ratification
of the Twenty-first Amendment, "[n]o longer may the dormant
commerce clause be read to protect interstate shipments of li~
uor from regulation; § 2 speaks directly to these shipments." 1 7
Every such regulation, he noted, is "'discrimination' ... because
every statute limiting importation leaves intrastate commerce
unaffected." Were such regulation held to be outside the ambit

153. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330.
154. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 110 ("The Twenty-first Amendment grants the
States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor
and how to structure the liquor distribution system.").
155. Sec Bridenbraugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 2000 WL 1286249 (7th Cir.) (Sept. 13,
2lXlO).
156. !d. at *2.
157. !d. at *5.
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of the Amendment, he concluded, "§ 2 would be a dead letter. ,Jss
As for the Supreme Court's case law allegedly forbidding
the sort of statute passed by Indiana, Judge Easterbrook correctly noted that "[n]o decision of the Supreme Court holds or
implies that laws limited to the importation of liquor are problematic under the dormant commerce clause." He read subsequent cases as "apply[ing] an unconstitutional conditions approach to the use of§ 2 power," further explaining that "[w]hat
the Court has held ... is that the greater power to forbid imports
does not imply a lesser power to allow imports on discriminatory
terms." 159 Thus, "unless the state has used its power to impose a
discriminatory condition on importation, one that favors Indiana
sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states, as
Hawaii did in Bacchus," the Indiana law was constitutional. 160
Because he could find no such discrimination and because, in his
opinion, the Indiana statute was exactly the sort of law intended
to be passed under Section Two's grant of power, the court upheld the statute. 161
158.
159.

Id.
Id. But sec note 184.
160. ld.
161. ld. at *6. Subsequent district court opinions, however, have not followed Judge
Easterbrook's analysis. Many courts accused Judge Easterbrook of ignoring "the last
forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to balancing and harmonizing the
dormant commerce clause and § 2 of the twenty-first amendment." Dickerson, 212 F.
Supp. 2d at 682; sec also Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 434 ("To accept the Bridenbaugh
court's decision as dispositive would require explicit rejection of the applicability of the
dormant Commerce Clause .... That conclusion is unacceptable in light of the Supreme
Court's decisions resolving the conflict between the Twenty-first Amendment and the
rest of the Constitution.") (footnote omitted). Other courts noted the difference between the law at issue in their cases, and the Indiana direct shipment law, which Judge
Easterbrook held to apply equally to in-state and out-of-state shippers. Sec Swedenburg,
2002 WL 3152103, at *7 ("That the New York direct shipping ban on out-of-state wine
... is discriminatory (on its face) is clear from the very wording ... of the exemptions
favoring in-state wineries.") (footnote omitted); Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 475
("[UJnlike the Seventh Circuit, this Court is faced with a statutory scheme that clearly
favors North Carolina sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states.") (emphasis added). But sec Heald v. Engler, (No. CJU.A 00-CV-71438) 2001 U.S. Dis!.
LEXJS 24825 at *10 (E. D. Mich.) (Sept. 28, 2001) (upholding a Michigan direct shipment
law that exempted in-state producers).
In the only other case to reach the Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit recently
vacated a Florida district court decision upholding that state's direct shipment laws
(which contain an in-state exemption), remanding the case for evidence regarding the
purpose served by the statutory scheme. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th
Cir. 2002). "If the subject of Florida's regulatory scheme were an ordinary widget (rather
than liquor)," Judge Tjollat wrote, "the statutes would violate the Commerce Clause.
But if the State demonstrates that its statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern
of the Twenty-first Amendment and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's statutes can be upheld." Jd. While noting that the Supreme Court had not been particularly
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V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR FUTURE CASES
As Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit
demonstrates, all is not lost. There is still hope for reviving the
moribund Twenty-first Amendment; perhaps the spate of recent
litigation over Internet alcohol sales will provide the tonic
needed to arrest its complete demise. In this last section, I will
put forth some principles that courts should employ when hearing cases involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to
state alcohol regulations-principles that follow directly from
the history of the Twenty-first Amendment and the subsequent
cases discussed above. Most of what follows seeks, as its intended audience, a hearing from the lower courts, although there
may also be hope at the Supreme Court level. 162 Accordingly, I
also have some suggestions for the Court.
A. LOWER COURTS
1. Remember the Text and Purpose of the Twenty-first
Amendment-Despite recent suggestions that only temperance,
or some similar police power aim, can justify treating alcohol differently from other consumer articles under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 163 the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment, particularly the controversy over the original "saloon" section and its eventual rejection, and the text of Section
Two make clear that the Amendment was about states receiving
helpful on this question, it seemed to accept that the universe of the Twenty-first
Amendment's "core concern[s]" was not exhausted by temperance. !d. at 1114-15. The
court also noted that a state's scheme could be discriminatory without constituting "mere
protectionism." !d. at 1113. One judge on the panel dissented, and would have upheld
the district court's decision upholding the laws. !d. at 1116 (Roney, C.J., dissenting).
Bainbridge, too, declined to follow Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Bridenbaugh. Id. at
1114 n.15 ("We disagree with the analytical framework used in that case and arc skeptical of its assessment of the facts.").
162. It is worth noting that, at present, three present members or the Court-Chid
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Stevens-have been among the most vocal
critics of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment decisions. Sec Healy, 491 U.S. at 345, 349
(Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("by reason of the Twenty-first
Amendment the States possess greater authority to regulate commerce in beer than they
do commerce in milk''; acknowledging power that Twenty-first Amendment gives states
over alcohol imports and alcohol distribution structure); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.,
476 U.S. at 586, 590-91 (Stevens, White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
greater power of exclusion from state includes lesser power to impose conditions on sale,
including power to require in-state sale prices be keyed to sale prices in other states);
Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 278, 279 (Stevens, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii because the
wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim is squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.").
163. Sec, e.g., Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 3).
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constitutional assurance of their power over the alcohol trade.
Without Section Two, the states had no assurance against repeal
of legislation like the Webb-Kenyon Act; and a change in personnel on the Supreme Court could have returned them to the
days when the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was employed to frustrate efforts to control alcohol importation. From
this, a second point naturally follows.
2. State Alcohol Regulations Should Come to Court with a
Presumption of Validity- There is a certain irony that in the
midst of the most vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism in
over sixty years, a specific textual reservation of power to states
has been eroded almost to the point of irrelevance. Even if the
"new" New Federalism is not her cup of tea, respect for the text
of the Twenty-first Amendment and its history ought to compel
a judge to presume the validity of state alcohol regulationsespecially those that regulate the importation or transportation
of alcohol into or through the state-regardless whether those
regulations make doing business more expensive for retailers or
consumers, or whether the regulations seem quaint or paternalistic. This presumption, of course, is not irrebuttable. As Judge
Easterbrook suggests in his opinion, and as the Court itself has
made clear, there are some limits to the state's power. While
there is ample evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the
Twenty-first Amendment sought freedom from the restraints of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, there is nothing to suggest that state alcohol regulators are to be free of the Due Process Clause 164 or the First Amendment. 165 Nor should the
Amendment permit one state to control the liquor trade within
its borders by reaching into other jurisdictions to regulate the
liquor trade in that state. 166 The core power is the power to control the importation of alcoholic beverages for delivery or use
within the state, and those ancillary powers that are necessary to
effectuate that core power. 167
3. Do Not Construe Supreme Court Cases in This Area
Broadly- The lower courts in recent alcohol cases insist on extracting broad principles from the Supreme Court cases, without
164. Sec note 116.
165. Sec note 116.
166. Sec note 115.
167. Thus, states ought to be given lccwa) m n:gulatmg through-shipments Sec
notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of early throughshipment cases) Like Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, I would lind this power to regulate through-shipments In the penumbra of the Twcnty-Jirst Amendment, mst<.:ad oJ allowing it as a matter of judicial grace, and only if "reasonable."
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sufficient attention to relevant facts that should counsel a narrower reading. Worse are the decisions that quote portions of
Court opinions (especially those portions stressing the need to
harmonize the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment, or that claim that it is folly to presume the Amendment
"repealed" the Commerce Clause) and treat those as the proposition for which the cases stand. 168 The Supreme Court cases
from which the choicest quotations are taken- Hostetter, Midcal
Aluminum, Bacchus Imports, and the like-are factually distinguishable from the recent alcohol cases concerning Internet sales
and direct shipment bans. 169 Lower courts should recognize that
whatever state regulations the Court has stuck down, it has always been careful to preserve the state's power to regulate alcohol imported into the state for delivery or use. The Court's language on this point has been quite unambiguous. 170 This
insensitivity to the factual context in which other cases arose, I
think stems from two related misunderstandings.
4. Do Not Misrake "Regulation" of Imports for Impermissible "Discrimination.,- The text of the Twenty-first Amendment
clearly entitles states to regulate importations into the state; no
Supreme Court case suggests otherwise. To claim, as recent
court decisions have, that requiring importers of alcohol to obtain a license from the state constitutes facial discrimination forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is absurd.
The differential treatment (imported alcohol versus domestically
produced alcohol, or out-of-state importers versus in-state retailers) is authorized by the Amendment itself. Benefits flowing
to intrastate distributors, retailers, brewers, or distillers are a
natural byproduct of the state's exercise of its constitutionallygranted power.
5. Do Not Allow Internet Commerce Elements to Confuse
the Issue- While the advent of the Internet and electronic commerce has convinced some that old rules do not apply, others
have cautioned that we should not get too carried away; that the
old rules do still have some application. 171 When older cases involved illegal importation of liquor into states in the back of a
truck or a car, 172 or, say, the transportation of several hundred
168. Sec notes 139-154 and accompanying text.
169. Sec notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
170. Sec notes 113, 122 & 130 and accompanying text.
171. Sec, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 Yale L.J. 785 (2001 ).
172. Sec, e.g., Atkins v. Manning, 56 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 1949) (upholding condcm-
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cases of Coors beer from Texarkana, Texas to Atlanta, Georgia,173 there was no question that the state had the power to
prosecute violations of its laws. That more recent cases involve
epicures importing fine wines ordered over the Internet, rather
than Big and Little Enos Burdette hiring the Bandit and the
Snowman to fetch their beer, 174 should not make one iota of difference in a court's analysis.
B. SUPREME COURT
1. Acknowledge Accessibility and Reliability of Intent of
Twenty-first Amendment-The Twenty-first Amendment was
debated and ratified in the early 1930s. Relevant materials describing positions of supporters and opponents, as well as the
perceptions of those who were to ratify the Amendment,
abound. 175 Yet, in several key Supreme Court opinions (not coincidentally those in which the Court was curbing the power of
the states) Justices have gone out of their wa~ to claim that the
intent is "confused" or that it does not exist. 76 Freed from inconvenient facts, the Court is then able to substitute its own
preferences for those of the Amendment's framers and ratifiers.
If the Court cannot even discern what an amendment passed just
sixty-odd years ago was supposed to accomplish, then one would
expect to see a complete abandonment of all attempts to inform
constitutional interpretation through the use of history. Since
this obviously has not happened in recent years, the question
then becomes why has the Twenty-first Amendment been
treated any differently than other amendments? As I showed in
an earlier section, the lack of clarity in the materials surrounding
the ratification of the Amendment cannot suffice as a reason.
2. Clarify Status ofYoung's Market Cases-Even if doubts
remained about the precise intent of the framers and ratifiers of

nation of truck used in illegal transportation of liquor from South Carolina; rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to condemnation: "the Twenty-first Amendment removes
spiritous liquors and alcohol from the protections of the commerce clause to the extent
necessary to allow the States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent"); sec also
Welborn v. Morely, 243 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Ark. 1951) (upholding confiscation of liquor
transported illegally into state during journey from Louisiana to Kansas); State v. Goldberg, 166 P.2d 664, 180-81 (Kan. 1946) (upholding forfeiture for transportation of intoxicating beverages in violation of state law).
173. Sec Smokey and the Bandit (Universal Pictures 1977).
174. See id.
175. Sec Part II.
176. See notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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the Twenty-first Amendment, the early case law could not have
been more clear. When it came to importation for delivery or
use, neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection
Clause applied. When it came to through-shipment or regulation of exports, great deference was accorded state regulations.
The Young's Market line of cases was so clear, in fact, that subsequent Courts (beginning with Hostetter) either had to twist
facts to escape the gravitational pull of those cases (Justice
Stewart's approach); simply to ignore them, relying on unsupported claims that the original intent commanded a different result (Justice White's approach); or conclude that there were interests that outweighed enforcement of the Amendment (Justice
Powell's approach). This transformation of the Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence from one of rules to one of standards
has, in effect, overruled the Young's Market line of cases, but
without the Court acknowledging responsibility for having done
so. Should the Court accept one of these alcohol cases for review, it should take the opportunity to do some doctrinal pruning. If it is too late to return to the days of Young's Market, so
be it; but the removal of doubt will greatly benefit both lawmakers and lower court judges.
3. Clearly Endorse Constitutional Power of States to Enforce
Control over Importation for Delivery or Use-Assuming that
the Court might be unlikely to regard the Young's Market line of
cases as its touchstone for interpreting the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court could still affirm the considerable power of the
states over liquor merely by enforcing the text of the Amendment. Not until Bacchus Imports did the Court strike down an
exercise of state power over liquor imports; 177 on the contrary,
earlier decisions affirmed that control over importation and liquor distribution-not merely an interest in promoting temperance, as Justice White suggested-were the core powers granted
by the Amendment. This would mean, at a minimum, that the
sorts of liquor licencing laws now being challenged would withstand scrutiny. Far from violating the Constitution, the state
would merely be exercising the very power given to it by the

177. While Hostetler struck down New York's regulation of Idlewild's operation, it
did so by asserting that the alcohol was not actually imported into the state for delivery
or usc in New York. In James B. Beam Distilling Co., the invalidation of Kentucky's tax
was on the ground that it offended the prohibitions of the Import-Export Clause, whose
limitations Justice Stewart claimed were left in tact by the Amendment. Sec notes 76-112
and accompanying text.
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Twenty-first Amendment, as the framers of that Amendment intended.
4. Overrule James B. Beam Distilling and Bacchus Imports
-Some might object to strict application of the text on the
ground that it could open the door to state suppression of, say,
First Amendment freedoms under the guise of alcohol regulations.178 But applying the text of the Amendment does not mean
completely ignoring the primary purpose of the Amendment: to
enable the states to control the liquor trade in their states,
whether it involves domestic producers or importations from
out-of-state, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine notwithstanding. That purpose is not implicated when a state alcohol
regulation, even one concerning imports, offends one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 However, a textual application of
the Amendment, with its purpose in mind, does suggest that
some of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is simply wrong, and
should be overruled. I suggest that the Court, should the opportunity arise, overrule James B. Beam Distillers and Bacchus Imports.
Even proponents of what one commentator called the
Court's "strangulation" 180 of the Twenty-first Amendment recognize the weakness of Justice Stewart's rationale for holdinfi
that states may not regulate the importation of foreign liquor. 1
No evidence from the framing or ratification of the Amendment
suggests that foreign liquor was to be given some sort of privileged position. And the text of the Amendment certainly suggests that no such distinction was contemplated.
The text of the Amendment also offers no support for Justice White's bald assertion, made in Bacchus Imports, that whatever the framers and ratifiers had in mind, they did not intend to
authorize states to engage in economic protectionism. In fact, in
the months immediately after the ratification, state legislatures
hurried to draft statutes exempting imported liquors from certain taxes and regulations, if their liquor was offered reciprocal
exemptions by other states. 182 Along with at least one statement
178. Sec note 116.
179. Sec note 116.
180. Sec Spaeth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 163 (cited in note 66) (characterizing recent decisions as having '·strangled much of the vitality from the twenty-first amendment'').
181. Sec note 107 and accompanying text.
182. Sec Wis..:r and Arledge, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 403 (cited in note 27) ("As
though in anticipation of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the grant of power
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made by a member of Congress opposing Section Two of the
Amendment because of the possibility states would abuse their
.
. 1aws con f"Irm what t he text suggests,
power 183 - these reciprocity
viz., that there was no distinction made between "good" regulations of imports and "bad" ones. 184

in the Twenty-first Amendment, some states had feared economic discrimination by
other states against their liquor products and several ... del!mcd it nccl!ssary to establish
by statute what ... amount to reciprocal trade agreements."). The authors ignore what
seems to bl! an equally plausible interpretation of lhl! states' actions: that the possibility
of resultant discrimination against out-of-state liquor was seen as a possible byproduct of
Section Two's grant of power. This cvidencl! of the states' understanding of the scope of
the Amendment, moreover, contradicts a earlier statement in the same article that "[t]he
second section of the Amendment generally was thought of as ... assurancl! that dry
states would be protected from an influx of imported liquor" as opposed to authorizing
'"state tariff laws." Id. at402.
183. Sec note 49 and accompanying text.
184. In his Bridenbaugh opinion, J udgc Easterbrook suggested that the Supreme
Court, in some recent Twenty-first Amendment cases like Bacchus Imports, had been
applying the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine: states may prohibit the importation
of liquor altogether, but if it chooses to allow importation, it may not condition the ability to import on the payment of discriminatory taxes or the submission to discriminatory
or protectionist regulations. Sec Bridenbaugh, 2000 WL at *5. Since Judge Easterbrook
found no such discrimination in the statute, other than that authorized by § 2's grant of
power, he upheld the Indiana regulatory scheme. Sec id
While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may furnish an l!xplanation for cases
like Constantineau and 44 Liquormart, where the First Amendml!nt and the right to due
process arc implicated, I think that it is inapplicable to cases like Bacchus Imports, in
which locally-produced liquor was exemptl!d from an otherwise generally-applicable excise tax.
In her seminal article on the subject, Kathleen Sullivan ddined thl! unconstitutional
c<Jnditions doctrine as holding "that government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not
do indirectly what it may not do directly" under a greater-includes-the-lesser view of
governmental power. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L.
Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989). In the context of the Twenty-first Amendment, then, Constantineau and 44 Liquormart arc correct: just because the state may prohibit alcohol altogether, it docs not follow that it has carte blanche to extort waivers of constitutional
rights as a condition of allowing its sale or purchase.
However, the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to situations in
which the state is allegedly engaging in discriminatory or protectionist regulation of outof-state liquor is more problematic. The right of an out-of-state commercial actor to be
free from discriminatory treatment at the hands of state governments derives from the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was understood to disable the dormant Commerce Clause as it applied to liquor-thus removing the "right" to import liquor free of stall! discrimination. Therefore, it seems that by
allowing liquor to be imported, but subjecting it to discriminatory regulations not imposed on domestically-produced liquor, the state is not attempting to "do indirectly what
it may not do directly"; rather, it is exercising the very power granted to It under the
Twenty-first Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
Recent lower court cases invalidating longstanding state alcohol regulations seem to have fallen under the spell of the
Internet, and assume that "e-commerce must be free!" But as
more courts have succumbed to the siren song of cyberspace,
they have in the process ignored constitutional text, evinced indifference to the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, and
misapplied Supreme Court precedent. They have, in fact, come
close to effecting a virtual repeal of the Amendment. But there
is opportunity in this new wave of litigation, the opportunity to
repair the erosion of state power under the Amendment caused
by years of parsimonious interpretation by the U.S. Supreme
Court. By keeping the text and the history of the Amendment
squarely in view, courts can not only restore a measure of state
power, but also protect the integrity of the amending process, as
well.
In response to judicial restrictions on state regulation of the
interstate alcohol trade, Congress passed a series of statutes
granting such regulatory power to the states, the restrictions of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine notwithstanding. These
congressional efforts culminated in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, which inaugurated a fourteen year experiment with national prohibition. When the decision was made to
end the experiment, state concerns about their ability to control
the alcohol trade reemerged. The history of the Twenty-first
Amendment's drafting demonstrates that its provisions were designed to allay those concerns by constitutionalizing state control
over alcohol imported into states. Proponents and opponents of
repeal both agreed that the power rightly belonged to the states,
and were careful to eliminate the possibility of federal encroachment upon that power by eliminating the "concurrent
power" provision, which would have empowered both the federal and state governments to regulate the saloon.
With that important change, what became the Twenty-first
Amendment was sent to the states for ratification. The "drys"
were assured that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
would not be revived to strike down state regulatory efforts; the
"wets," too, were provided with constitutional assurances that
dry forces could not use a concurrent power provision to reestablish some form of federal prohibition in the future. As the
participants understood it, the main question regarding alcohol
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regulation was one of power. The Twenty-first Amendment settled it in favor of the states.
Early Supreme Court cases clearly reflected that understanding, refusing to rewrite the Amendment under the guise of
interpreting it, even when the Court was presented with discriminatory state regulatory regimes. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Supreme Court has consistently made inroads on the
power reserved to the states by the Amendment. Finally, in
1984, the Court signaled an intent to apply to state alcohol regulations the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis that the
Amendment was intended to foreclose. At no time, moreover,
has the Court made a convincing case for the correctness of its
more recent decisions, as compared with its earlier decisions declining to supervise state control of alcohol. Recent lower court
decisions have continued the virtual repeal of the Twenty-first
Amendment by broadly construing the Supreme Court's restrictive cases, while ignoring important factual differences between
those cases and the recent cases involving direct shipment bans
that would prohibit, for example, Internet alcohol sales. If the
trend continues, the Amendment will become a dead letter.
Were the matter of the Twenty-first Amendment simply
one of cheap versus expensive liquor, or whether states ought to
protect local interests as a matter of policy, I might applaud the
actions of the Court. After all, the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is a powerful judicial weapon designed to enforce the
"common market" vision of the Framers-and so much the better for the Nation. But, as is so often the case when means are
subordinated to ends in fashioning constitutional law, there are
real costs to the approach the Court ultimately chose to take.
Perhaps the most serious cost of judicial abnegation of the
Twenty-first Amendment is to the integrity of the amending
process itself. As Laurence Tribe has noted, "[t]he resort to
amendment-to constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional law-should be taken as a sign that the legal system has
come to a point of discontinuity, a point at which something ...
distinctly more radical than ordinary legal evolution is called
for." 185 If members of Congress who propose amendments, and
those in the states who are called upon to ratify them cannot be
assured that the judiciary will respect the "constitutional politics" of the amendment when interpreting it, then one might for185. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433,436 (1983).
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give them for asking whether it is worth going to the trouble of
proposing Article V amendments at all. Such treatment might
also signal to the judiciary that amendments need not be taken
seriously. 186 Thus does the alleged lack of importance of the Article V amending process become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Not only would the denigration of our amending process (so
important to the Framers 187 ) be a loss for our constitutional regime, but it might have more ominous consequences for constitutionalism in general. For if the judiciary is not bound to respect the words and intent animating a relatively young
amendment, then why should the Constitution's other, older textual boundaries command observance? The written nature of
the Constitution was cited by Chief Justice John Marshall as one
of the primary justifications for placing in the courts the power
to review congressional acts for constitutionality. 188 Unfortunately, even in this age when, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson,
"we are all textualists, we are all originalists," the history of the
Twenty-first Amendment shows that some members of the judiciary regard parts of the Constitution as less important than others. Thus, when contemplating the fate of the Twenty-first
Amendment, it hardly seems alarmist to wonder whether other
parts of the Constitution are similarly vulnerable.

186. This is what seems to have happened to the Twenty-seventh Amendment, U.S.
Const. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have
intervened."). Sec Brannon P. Denning and John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal
Rights Amendment, 17 Const. Comm. 5l!3, 5l!8-l!l) (2000) (describing subsequent judicial
treatments of the Twenty-seventh Amendment). For an argument that constitutional
amendment arc not, in fact, important, sec David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L Rev. 1457 (20(Jl ). But sec Brannon P. Denning and
John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitlllional Amendments: A Reply to David Strauss, 77
Tul. L Rev. 247 (2002).
187. Sec, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Means 10 Amend: Theories of Constitutional
Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 162 (llili7) (noting that the delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention unanimously approved a resolution calling for the inclusion of a provision
allowing for amendment).
188. Sec Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (writing that under
our Constitution, '·ft)hc powers of the legislature arc defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose arc
powers hmitcd, and ... that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be rctrained' 1") A constitution, he continued "is
either a superior paramount law ... or it is on a level with ordinary acts." Id.
'

